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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judges
SLOVITER, SCIRICA, SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES,
JORDAN, and HARDIMAN, join, and AMBRO joins as to
Part III only.
Ruben Mitchell was indicted on one count of
attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
Following Mitchell‘s indictment, arrest, and detention, the
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Government sought to collect a DNA sample.
The
Government relied on 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A), which
permits the collection of DNA samples from ―individuals
who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted.‖ Mitchell
objected, arguing that the statute violated the Fourth
Amendment. Agreeing with Mitchell, the District Court
concluded that the statute was unconstitutional and prohibited
the Government from taking a DNA sample from Mitchell
prior to conviction.
As a threshold matter, we address whether we possess
appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal by the
Government. We conclude that this appeal falls within the
narrow class of orders immediately appealable under the
collateral order doctrine enunciated in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). Turning to
the merits, we apply a ―totality of the circumstances‖ test,
balancing the intrusion on Mitchell‘s privacy against the
Government‘s interest in the collection and testing of his
DNA. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19
(2001). As arrestees have a diminished expectation of
privacy in their identities, and DNA collection from arrestees
serves important law enforcement interests, we conclude that
such collection is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Accordingly, we will reverse.
I.
Mitchell was indicted on a single count of attempted
possession with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Thereafter, he was
arrested and placed in pretrial detention. At Mitchell‘s initial
appearance before a Magistrate Judge, the Government
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sought to collect a sample of Mitchell‘s DNA1 pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A)2 and its implementing regulation,
28 C.F.R. § 28.12. The statute, as amended in 2006, permits
the collection of DNA samples from ―individuals who are
arrested, facing charges, or convicted.‖
42 U.S.C. §
14135a(a)(1)(A). Mitchell objected, arguing that the statute
violated the Fourth Amendment; the Magistrate Judge
ordered briefing and stayed the collection of Mitchell‘s DNA
pending resolution by the District Court. Prior to the
resolution of the DNA issue, the District Court held a
detention hearing and detained Mitchell pending trial.
In a Memorandum Opinion, the District Court held
that § 14135a(a)(1)(A) and its implementing regulation
violate the Fourth Amendment insofar as they permit the
warrantless collection of DNA from individuals who have not
been convicted of a crime. Applying a ―totality of the
circumstances‖ analysis, the District Court assessed ―‗on the
one hand, the degree to which [the DNA collection] intrudes
upon an individual‘s privacy and, on the other, the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.‘‖ Samson v. California, 547 U.S.
1

―DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic acid. DNA molecules
carry the genetic information of human beings. DNA is
unique to each individual, except in the case of identical
twins.‖ United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 181 n.2 (3d
Cir. 2005).
2

Section 14135a was enacted as part of the DNA Analysis
Backlog Elimination Act of 2000. We will refer to this Act
and all subsequent versions of the statute as the ―DNA Act.‖
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843, 848 (2006) (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–19).
Considering Mitchell‘s status as an arrestee and a pretrial
detainee, the District Court held that ―Mitchell has a
diminished expectation of privacy in his identity‖ and thus
may be subjected to routine booking procedures such as
fingerprinting. United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d
597, 608 (W.D. Pa. 2009). Nevertheless, the District Court
declined to equate ―the fingerprinting process and the
resulting identification information obtained therefrom with
DNA profiling‖ given ―the complex, comprehensive,
inherently private information contained in a DNA sample.‖
Id. ―The extraction of DNA,‖ the District Court reasoned, ―is
much more than a mere progression [from] taking fingerprints
and photographs[;] it represents a quantum leap that is
entirely unnecessary for identification purposes.‖ Id. at 608–
09. As a result, the District Court concluded that while taking
the DNA sample ―may not be unreasonably intrusive, the
search of the sample is quite intrusive, severely affecting
Mitchell‘s expectation of privacy in his most intimate
matters.‖ Id. at 609.
With respect to the Government‘s interests, the District
Court determined that there was no compelling need to take
Mitchell‘s DNA sample for identification purposes. While
collecting DNA also serves investigative purposes, ―there
[was] no exigency that support[ed] the collection of DNA
from an arrestee or pretrial detainee‖ as opposed to waiting
until after a conviction or obtaining a proper search warrant.
Id. at 610.
Accordingly, weighing Mitchell‘s privacy
interests against the Government‘s legitimate interests, the
District Court concluded that the universal collection of DNA
samples from arrestees and pretrial detainees was
unreasonable and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. In
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the accompanying Order, the District Court prohibited the
Government from collecting a DNA sample from Mitchell
―until such time as he has been convicted of the offense set
forth in the indictment.‖ Id. at 611. The Government sought
reconsideration, which was denied.
The Government timely appealed and expressed an
interest in expediting the appeal. We ordered the parties to
address both the request to expedite and the jurisdictional
basis for the appeal in their motion and response.3 Following
the parties‘ submissions, we granted the Government‘s
request to expedite and directed the parties to address the
issue of our subject matter jurisdiction in their merits briefs.
A three-judge panel heard oral argument; however, while the
case was under consideration, it was determined that the case
should be heard en banc pursuant to Third Circuit Internal
Operating Procedure 9.4.1.
This appeal presents two issues: (1) whether the
District Court‘s decision is immediately appealable under the
collateral order doctrine, and, if so, (2) whether the collection

3

Mitchell was originally represented by the Federal Public
Defender (―FPD‖). On November 19, 2010, the District
Court granted the FPD‘s motion to withdraw as counsel and
issued an order appointing attorney John A. Knorr to
represent Mitchell. Subsequently, this Court also terminated
the FPD‘s representation and appointed Knorr to represent
Mitchell on appeal. We then appointed the FPD as amicus
curiae on the basis that the issues in the case had the potential
to affect other defendants.
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of DNA from arrestees and pretrial detainees violates the
Fourth Amendment.
II.
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3231. Mitchell contests our jurisdiction. ―We
necessarily exercise de novo review over an argument
alleging a lack of appellate jurisdiction.‖4 Reilly v. City of
Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 223 (3d Cir. 2008). Our standard
of review of the District Court‘s resolution of Mitchell‘s
Fourth Amendment claim is likewise de novo. United States
v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 2005).
III.
Mitchell asserts that we cannot exercise jurisdiction
over the present appeal by the Government. He argues first
that the Government lacks statutory authority under the
Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731, to appeal from the
District Court‘s adverse ruling in this criminal case. Second,
he contends that this appeal does not fall within the collateral
order doctrine. We address each of Mitchell‘s arguments in
turn.
A. Criminal Appeals Act
Mitchell correctly cites the well-established rule that
―‗an appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not
4

To the extent that we have jurisdiction, we exercise it under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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favored and must be based upon express statutory authority.‘‖
United States v. Farnsworth, 456 F.3d 394, 399 (3d Cir.
2006) (quoting United States v. Gilchrist, 215 F.3d 333, 335–
36 (3d Cir. 2000)). In general, the United States may appeal
in a criminal case only as permitted by the Criminal Appeals
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731, which limits appeals to cases
involving the dismissal of charges, suppression or exclusion
of evidence, return of seized property, or release of a
defendant.5
Neither party argues that the present appeal falls into
one of the categories of orders appealable pursuant to § 3731.
Mitchell contends that this alone resolves the question and
strips us of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has concluded to
the contrary, however, holding that in certain limited
instances, ―orders relating to a criminal case may be found to
possess sufficient independence from the main course of the
prosecution to warrant treatment as plenary orders, and thus
be appealable on the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 without
regard to the limitations of 18 U.S.C. § 3731.‖ Carroll v.
United States, 354 U.S. 394, 403 (1957). In other words,
while the Government must have express statutory authority
to appeal in a criminal case, there are two statutes that
provide this authority: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 3731, for a
circumscribed list of orders; and (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1291, for
collateral orders. The appeal of a collateral order by the
Government is thus an exception to the strictures of § 3731.
See United States v. Ferri, 686 F.2d 147, 150–52 (3d Cir.
1982) (examining whether jurisdiction was proper under the
collateral order doctrine of § 1291 after the Government
5

The Government may also seek appellate review of a
sentence as delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
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conceded that jurisdiction was lacking under § 3731); United
States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 227 (4th Cir. 2007)
(same); United States v. Peterson, 394 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir.
2005) (deciding whether ―the appeal is sufficiently
independent from [the defendant‘s] underlying criminal case
to make it one of the few criminal appeals permitted under
section 1291‖); United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 768 (1st
Cir. 1994) (holding that ―under what we choose to call the
‗special circumstance‘ exception, a government appeal may
be entertained in a criminal case on the authority of section
1291 if the appeal satisfies the conditions of the so-called
collateral order doctrine‖). This authority makes clear that
even though the challenged order is not appealable under §
3731, the Government may still maintain this appeal if the
order qualifies as collateral.
B. Collateral Order Doctrine
The final judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 limits the
jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to review of ―final
decisions of the district courts.‖ Section 1291 ―[o]rdinarily . .
. ‗prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition
of sentence‘ in a criminal case.‖ United States v. Wecht, 537
F.3d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Flanagan v. United
States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984)). In Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), the
Supreme Court applied a ―practical rather than a technical
construction‖ to § 1291 and carved out a narrow exception to
the final judgment rule, which has come to be known as the
collateral order doctrine. This exception deems as ―final
judgments‖ those decisions that, while they do not end the
litigation on the merits, ―finally determine claims of right
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,
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too important to be denied review and too independent of the
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred
until the whole case is adjudicated.‖ Id. Thereafter, in
Carroll, 354 U.S. at 403, the Supreme Court held that the
collateral order doctrine was applicable in criminal cases to
orders ―possess[ing] sufficient independence from the main
course of the prosecution.‖
―To come within the ‗small class‘ of decisions
excepted from the final-judgment rule by Cohen,‖ an order
must (1) ―conclusively determine the disputed question,‖ (2)
―resolve an important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action,‖ and (3) ―be effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment.‖ Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); accord Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003) (applying the Cohen test in a
criminal case); Wecht, 537 F.3d at 228. All three of these
requirements must be met for an order to qualify as collateral.
We, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 322, 324 (3d Cir.
1999).
We have ―consistently construed the collateral order
exception narrowly lest the exception swallow up the salutary
general rule that only final orders be appealed. Moreover,
strict construction of the collateral order doctrine is consistent
with the longstanding congressional policy against piecemeal
appeals that underlies the final judgment rule.‖ Id. at 324–25
(internal quotation marks & citations omitted). In criminal
cases, ―[b]ecause of the compelling interest in prompt trials,
the [Supreme] Court has interpreted the requirements of the
collateral-order exception to the final judgment rule with the
utmost strictness in criminal cases.‖ Flanagan, 465 U.S. at
265; accord Gov’t of the V.I. v. Rivera, 333 F.3d 143, 150
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n.16 (3d Cir. 2003). To be appealable under the collateral
order doctrine, a pretrial order in a criminal case must involve
―an asserted right the legal and practical value of which
would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.‖
Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 265 (internal quotation marks &
citations omitted).
As the Supreme Court has instructed, ―[t]o guard
against the temptation to expand the doctrine‘s reach, . . . ‗the
issue of appealability under § 1291 is to be determined for the
entire category to which a claim belongs.‘ This approach
reflects the Court‘s insistence that the finality requirement of
§ 1291 must not be reduced to a case-by-case determination .
. . .‖ We, 174 F.3d at 325 (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994)) (further
citation omitted); accord Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, -- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 599, 606–09 (2009) (declining to classify
disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege as
collateral in part because the interest protected by the
privilege did not ―justify the cost of allowing immediate
appeal of the entire class of relevant orders‖). As the
Supreme Court recently stated:
The justification for immediate appeal must . . .
be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual
benefits of deferring appeal until litigation
concludes. This requirement finds expression
in two of the three traditional Cohen conditions.
The second condition insists upon important
questions separate from the merits. More
significantly, the third Cohen question, whether
a right is adequately vindicable or effectively
reviewable, simply cannot be answered without
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a judgment about the value of the interests that
would be lost through rigorous application of a
final judgment requirement. That a ruling may
burden litigants in ways that are only
imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a
final district court judgment . . . has never
sufficed. Instead, the decisive consideration is
whether delaying review until the entry of final
judgment would imperil a substantial public
interest or some particular value of a high order.
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 605 (internal quotation marks &
citations omitted).
The first requirement of the collateral order doctrine is
that the order must ―conclusively determine the disputed
question.‖ Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468. ―We cannot
review any decision that is ‗tentative, informal, or
incomplete.‘‖ Wecht, 537 F.3d at 230 (quoting Cohen, 337
U.S. at 546). Both parties agree that the District Court‘s
Orders granting Mitchell‘s motion and denying the
Government‘s motion for reconsideration conclusively
determined a disputed question.
The parties, however, contest the scope and phrasing
of the disputed question, a disagreement that ultimately does
not affect our conclusion as to whether the first element of the
Cohen test is satisfied.
According to Mitchell, the
Government ―mischaracterizes the issue in this appeal too
broadly and obscures the right at stake when it says that ‗the
disputed question [is] whether § 14135a(a)(1)(A) . . .
comport[s] with the Fourth Amendment and thus whether
Mitchell[,] as a pre-trial detainee, has a legal right to avoid

13

forced collection of a DNA sample.‘‖ (Mitchell Br. 15
(quoting Gov‘t Br. 13).) Mitchell‘s argument is correct
insofar as the precise issue at stake is actually the
Government’s authority to collect a DNA sample from a
pretrial detainee under federal law and not Mitchell’s right to
be free from such collection. But this is a distinction without
a difference. Ultimately, the District Court concluded that
―42 U.S.C. § 14135a, and its accompanying regulations,
requiring a charged defendant to submit a DNA sample for
analysis and inclusion in [the Combined DNA Index System] 6
without independent suspicion or a warrant[,] unreasonably
intrude[] on such defendant‘s expectation of privacy and [are]
invalid under the Fourth Amendment.‖ Mitchell, 681 F.
Supp. 2d at 611. Thus, the District Court conclusively
determined that § 14135a violates the Fourth Amendment
insofar as it permits the collection of a DNA sample from an
arrestee or a pretrial detainee. Moreover, it denied the
Government‘s motion for reconsideration, confirming that the
District Court does not intend to further address the
constitutionality of the DNA Act with respect to arrestees and
pretrial detainees. See Wecht, 537 F.3d at 230 n.14; United
States v. Whittaker, 268 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding
that order was conclusive when ―there [was] no possibility . .
. that, depending upon future events, the district court might
reconsider its position‖).
Ultimately, the District Court conclusively decided a
question of constitutional law. The District Court prohibited
the Government from exercising its authority pursuant to
§ 14135a and its implementing regulation to collect a DNA
6

Throughout this opinion we will also refer to the ―Combined
DNA Index System‖ by its acronym, CODIS.
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sample from Mitchell because, in the court‘s view, such
collection would violate Mitchell‘s Fourth Amendment rights.
As such, the orders at issue here satisfy the first requirement
of the collateral order doctrine.
The second requirement is that the order ―resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action.‖ Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468. ―This is
sometimes divided into two sub-requirements: (a) the issue
must be important; and (b) the issue must be completely
separate from the merits of the action.‖ Wecht, 537 F.3d at
230. With respect to the first sub-requirement, ―[t]he
Supreme Court has defined an important issue as one
involving interests that are weightier than the societal
interests advanced by the ordinary operation of final
judgment principles or one that is serious and unsettled.‖ Id.
at 230–31 (internal quotation marks & citations omitted);
accord Pierce v. Blaine, 467 F.3d 362, 370–71 (3d Cir. 2006)
(―[A]n issue is important if the interests that would potentially
go unprotected without immediate appellate review are
significant relative to efficiency interests sought to be
advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.‖ (internal
quotation marks & citation omitted)). In other words, the
issue must be ―important in a jurisprudential sense.‖ Christy
v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Praxis
Props., Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 947 F.2d 49, 56 (3d Cir.
1991)).
It is true, as Mitchell argues, that in many criminal
cases holding that interlocutory review was warranted, the
important issue at stake involved the rights of the defendant.
See, e.g., Sell, 539 U.S. at 176 (concluding that defendant‘s
right to avoid forced medication is important); Abney v.
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United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977) (concluding that
defendant‘s right to avoid trial on double jeopardy grounds is
important). Yet other cases have held that interests asserted
by the Government or by the public at large are sufficiently
important to merit interlocutory review. See, e.g., Whittaker,
268 F.3d at 192 (order disqualifying United States Attorney
for Eastern District of Pennsylvania); United States v.
Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 592 (3d Cir. 1992) (order prohibiting
federal law enforcement agents from arresting subject of valid
arrest warrant).
The interest asserted by the Government in the present
case—exercising its statutory authority to collect a DNA
sample from an arrestee or a pretrial detainee—is similarly
important.
Congress passed a statute permitting such
collection, and the Attorney General promulgated regulations
directing it. Vindicating the intent of Congress and the
Attorney General can be jurisprudentially important. Cf.
Praxis Props., 947 F.2d at 56 (resolving meaning of federal
statute jurisprudentially ―important‖ under Cohen).
Moreover, the Government‘s interest in conducting
reasonable searches for law enforcement purposes and
individuals‘ rights to be free from unreasonable searches, like
issues of ―involuntary medical treatment,‖ ―raise[] questions
of clear constitutional importance.‖ Sell, 539 U.S. at 176.
Mitchell argues that the Government‘s interest in obtaining a
DNA sample before trial is not sufficiently weighty as it is
merely a matter of timing given that the Government will be
able to collect Mitchell‘s DNA upon conviction. As we
discuss in the following section, the interests implicated in
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pretrial collection of DNA, however, are not fully satisfied
through post-trial collection.7
The second sub-requirement, that the issue be
completely separate from the merits, ―derives from the
principle that there should not be piecemeal review of issues
that will later merge with the final judgment and thus require
the court to review the same issue twice.‖ Santtini, 963 F.2d
at 592 (citing Praxis Props., 947 F.2d at 56–57). The merits
of the present action are Mitchell‘s guilt or innocence of the
offense of attempted possession with intent to distribute five
or more kilograms of cocaine. Whether the Government may
collect Mitchell‘s DNA prior to conviction is entirely distinct
from the underlying criminal prosecution.

7

Mitchell further argues that the Government does not have
an important interest in the pretrial collection of DNA
samples as it ―does not have the capacity to analyze DNA
samples in a timely manner, as evidenced by the hundreds of
thousands of DNA samples collected but not yet analyzed.‖
(Mitchell Br. 21.) The report cited by Mitchell in support of
this contention, however, discusses the backlog in analysis of
DNA samples collected by the states in state and local
laboratories and has no bearing on the FBI‘s analysis of
samples collected from federal pretrial detainees. See U.S.
Dep‘t of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., Audit Report
No. 09-23, Audit of the Convicted Offender DNA Backlog
Reduction
Program
i–iv
(2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/OJP/a0923/final.pdf.
Moreover, ―the national backlog of convicted offender
samples awaiting analysis [in state laboratories] has
declined.‖ Id. at viii.
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The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
United States v. Peterson, 394 F.3d 98, 104–05 (2d Cir.
2005), a case that involved the collection of a DNA sample
pursuant to conviction. After Peterson was released on
probation, he received a letter from the United States
Probation Office directing him to appear to submit a blood
sample for DNA testing. 394 F.3d at 100–01. Peterson
refused, arguing that his conviction was not a qualifying
offense under the statute,8 and the Government petitioned the
district court to summon Peterson to a violation hearing. Id.
at 101. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding
that Peterson‘s offense was not a qualifying offense under the
statute and that Peterson had not violated any conditions of
probation. Id. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that it had
jurisdiction to review the order dismissing the petition under
the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 104–05. The court
reasoned that the ―determination that Peterson did not violate
the terms of his probation had nothing to do with the merits of
Peterson‘s criminal conviction. All the District Court decided
was the purely legal question whether Peterson‘s conviction
for bank larceny required him to submit to the collection of a
DNA sample.‖ Id. Furthermore, ―[n]othing the District
Court could have done in response to the government‘s
petition would in any way have affected, or even called into
question, the validity of Peterson‘s underlying conviction or
the validity of the sentence imposed by the District Court.‖
Id. at 105.

8

Contested in Peterson was the version of the DNA Act that
existed in 2002. The DNA Act has subsequently been
amended to make ―any felony‖ a qualifying offense. Pub. L.
No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260, 2270 (Oct. 30, 2004).
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In Peterson, the issue of whether the Government was
permitted to take a DNA sample arose after his trial and
conviction, whereas here, the question has been raised before
trial. This difference in when the DNA was sought is,
however, inconsequential in this case at least, because in both
circumstances the legal issue ―ha[s] nothing to do with the
merits of‖ the criminal case. Accordingly, the challenged
order is ―‗truly collateral.‘‖ Id. (quoting Abney, 431 U.S. at
660).
Mitchell argues to the contrary, contending that the
question of pretrial collection of his DNA ―is inextricably tied
to the merits of [his] prosecution‖ as the Government could
use ―the DNA as a crime-solving-prosecutory-tool in the case
against [him].‖ (Mitchell Br. 25.) This argument, however,
misconstrues the nature of the search at issue in this appeal.
The statute and regulation pursuant to which the Government
sought Mitchell‘s DNA allow for the suspicionless collection
of DNA samples from arrestees and pretrial detainees for
purposes of identification.
Nothing in the record
demonstrates that Mitchell‘s DNA will be an issue at trial or
that the Government intends to compare Mitchell‘s DNA
sample to DNA evidence collected from a crime scene.
Moreover, if in fact, the present case did involve DNA
evidence from a crime scene, and the Government wished to
compare Mitchell‘s DNA to the DNA evidence left at the
scene, it would have to obtain a warrant to collect Mitchell‘s
DNA for purposes of comparing the two.9 Instead, the
9

In this respect, we disagree with the dissent‘s
characterization of the Government‘s interest as using the
DNA sample to ―ascertain the defendant‘s identity as it
relates to the guilt or innocence of the crime he is currently
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Government seeks Mitchell‘s DNA sample as directed by 28
C.F.R. § 28.12, which mandates such collection from
individuals who are arrested or facing charges. Whether the
Government is constitutionally allowed to do so without
suspicion is a question completely separate from the issue of
Mitchell‘s guilt or innocence.
The third requirement of the collateral order doctrine is
that the order must ―be effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment.‖ Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at
468. The relevant inquiry is whether the issue presented is in
―danger of becoming moot upon conviction and sentence.‖
Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 266; accord United States v. Fisher,
871 F.2d 444, 449 (3d Cir. 1989).
―[T]he decisive
consideration is whether delaying review until the entry of
final judgment ‗would imperil a substantial public interest‘ or
‗some particular value of a high order.‘‖ Mohawk, 130 S. Ct.
at 605 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352–53
(2006)).
As the Supreme Court has recently held, ―[t]he crucial
question . . . is not whether an interest is important in the
abstract; it is whether deferring review until final judgment so
imperils the interest as to justify the cost of allowing
immediate appeal of the entire class of relevant orders.‖
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 606. The question presented in this
appeal would clearly become moot upon final judgment. If
Mitchell is convicted, the Government will be able to collect
being charged with.‖ (Dissenting Op. at 9). Again, the
identity of the arrestee, that is whether this person is actually
Ruben Mitchell, is completely distinct from any questions of
guilt or innocence.
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his DNA pursuant to a different provision of the DNA Act, 42
U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(B), which mandates collection from
―each individual in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons who
is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense.‖
Possession with intent to distribute cocaine is a qualifying
federal offense under the statute. See id. § 14135a(d)(1).
Collection of DNA samples from convicted felons has been
upheld as constitutional by every circuit court to have
considered the issue. See, e.g., Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553
F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d
674 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941
(9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2007); United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir.
2007); Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir.
2007); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006);
Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175; Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). On the other
hand, if Mitchell is acquitted, the Government will have no
right to collect his DNA. In either case, the Government‘s
statutory authority to collect DNA from an arrestee or a
pretrial detainee would not be before the Court.
The Government has no other opportunity during the
trial to seek to vindicate its statutory authority. Thus, the
Government‘s interest in collecting DNA from pretrial
detainees ―is not adequately redressable on appeal after final
judgment, regardless of the trial‘s outcome.‖ Wecht, 537 F.3d
at 229; see also Whittaker, 268 F.3d at 193 (holding that an
order disqualifying an entire United States Attorney‘s Office
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from prosecuting a criminal case is not effectively reviewable
on appeal).10
Moreover, the Government‘s authority to collect DNA
pre-trial is not adequately vindicated through post-conviction
collection. In Wecht, we held that an order denying the media
access to the names of prospective jurors was immediately
reviewable as a collateral order. 537 F.3d at 227. We
rejected the suggestion that post-trial release of such
information would ―vindicate the public‘s asserted right of
access,‖ reasoning that ―[a]lthough post-trial release of
information may be better than none at all, the value of the
right of access would be seriously undermined if it could not
be contemporaneous.‖ Id. at 229. Thus, we concluded that
―the value of contemporaneous disclosure, as opposed to
post-trial disclosure, is significant enough to justify our
immediate review of the matter under the collateral order
doctrine.‖ Id. Similarly, allowing the Government to collect
a DNA sample from Mitchell post-trial would better serve the
10

Mitchell cites Mohawk to argue that interlocutory review is
inappropriate because the District Court‘s Order does not ―so
imperil[] the [G]overnment‘s interest in collecting [his] DNA
so as to justify the cost of allowing the immediate appeal of a
whole class of similar orders.‖ (Mitchell Br. 24 (citing
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 605)) Even assuming that our decision
would permit a whole ―class‖ of orders relating to DNA
collection to be subject to interlocutory review, these classes
are ultimately circumscribed and would accord with our
policy of allowing collateral order review in criminal cases
only ―sparingly.‖ Rivera, 333 F.3d at 150 n.16. As such,
collateral order review in the present case is consistent with
Mohawk.
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Government‘s interest than forbidding all such collection.
Nevertheless, as will become clear in the following section,
the value to the Government of pre-trial collection, rather
than post-conviction collection, is sufficiently distinct to
merit interlocutory review.
In sum, the District Court‘s Order prohibiting the
pretrial collection of a DNA sample from Mitchell is subject
to collateral order review. We are mindful of the Supreme
Court‘s instruction in Flanagan that in criminal cases, ―the
requirements of the collateral-order exception to the final
judgment rule [must be interpreted] with the utmost
strictness.‖ 465 U.S. at 265. At bottom, the Flanagan Court
was concerned about the policy of finality, which ―is at its
strongest in the field of criminal law.‖ Id. at 264 (quoting
United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263,
265 (1982)). Yet our decision to exercise immediate review
does not harm the finality of Mitchell‘s criminal case.
Regardless of the outcome of this appeal, Mitchell‘s trial will
proceed unaffected. As the Supreme Court has held, ―matters
embraced in [a] trial court‘s pretrial order . . . are truly
collateral to the criminal prosecution itself [when] they will
not ‗affect, or . . . be affected by, decision of the merits of
th[e] case.‘‖ Abney, 431 U.S. at 660 (quoting Cohen, 337
U.S. at 546); see also United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415,
422 (5th Cir. 2000) (exercising collateral review of a gag
order, as such review would have no impact on the criminal
trial). Accordingly, our exercise of jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to the collateral order doctrine is consistent
with the policy of finality.
IV.
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A. The DNA Act
The statute challenged by Mitchell is the latest and
most far-reaching version of the DNA Act. In 1994,
Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act (―Crime Control Act‖), Pub. L. No. 103322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
13701–14223), which authorized the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (―FBI‖) to establish an index of DNA samples.
Pursuant to this authority, the FBI created the Combined
DNA Index System (―CODIS‖), which ―allows State and
local forensics laboratories to exchange and compare DNA
profiles electronically in an attempt to link evidence from
crime scenes for which there are no suspects to DNA samples
of convicted offenders on file in the system.‖ H.R. Rep. 106900(I), at 8 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323,
2324.
Thereafter, in 2000, Congress enacted the DNA Act,
which required the collection of a DNA sample ―from each
individual in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons who is, or
has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense‖ and from
each ―individual on probation, parole, or supervised release.‖
Pub. L. No. 106-546, § 3(a)(1) & (2), 114 Stat. 2726, 2728
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1) & (2)).
Pursuant to the DNA Act, ―[t]he Attorney General, the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or the probation office
responsible . . . may use or authorize the use of such means as
are reasonably necessary to detain, restrain, and collect a
DNA sample from an individual who refuses to cooperate in
the collection of the sample.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(4)(A).
Moreover, ―[a]n individual from whom the collection of a
DNA sample is authorized under this subsection who fails to
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cooperate in the collection of that sample shall be . . . guilty
of a class A misdemeanor.‖ Id. § 14135a(a)(5)(A). Once the
DNA sample is collected, the collection kit is forwarded to
the FBI for analysis and inclusion in CODIS. Id. §
14135a(b).
The DNA Act includes a number of safeguards to
prevent the improper use of DNA samples. First, the Act
explicitly restricts the use of DNA test results to the purposes
specified in the Crime Control Act. Id. § 14135e(b). The
Crime Control Act limits disclosure ―to criminal justice
agencies for law enforcement identification purposes;‖ ―in
judicial proceedings, if otherwise admissible;‖ ―for criminal
defense purposes, to a defendant, who shall have access to
samples or analyses performed in connection with the case in
which such defendant is charged;‖ and, ―if personally
identifiable information is removed, for a population statistics
database, for identification research and protocol
development purposes, or for quality control purposes.‖ Id. §
14132(b)(3).
Second, pursuant to the DNA Act, ―a[ny] person who
knowingly discloses a sample or [DNA] result . . . in any
manner to any person not authorized to receive it, or obtains
or uses, without authorization, such sample or result‖ is
punishable by a fine of up to $250,000 or imprisonment for a
period of up to one year. Id. § 14135e(c). Moreover, each
unlawful disclosure of the sample or result is punishable as a
―separate offense.‖ Id. Under the Crime Control Act, failure
to comply with ―the quality control and privacy
requirements‖ can result in cancellation of access to CODIS.
Id. §14132(c). In addition, the Crime Control Act requires
the Director of the FBI to expunge the DNA record from

25

CODIS when a conviction is overturned or when, if the
sample is taken following an arrest, the charge is dismissed or
results in an acquittal or no charge is timely filed. Id. §
14132(d)(1)(A). Expungement requires that the FBI receive a
certified copy of a final court order establishing the final
disposition of the arrest or conviction. See id.
Additionally, two important Government policies that
are not laid out in the statute provide protection against the
improper use of the DNA profiles. The first of these relates
to the type and amount of information contained in CODIS.
The FBI limits the information stored in CODIS—―[n]o
names or other personal identifiers of the offenders, arrestees,
or detainees are stored.‖ Federal Bureau of Investigation,
CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet,11 available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-factsheet (last visited July 8, 2011). Instead, the database
contains only the following information: (1) the DNA
profile; (2) a number identifying the agency that submitted
the DNA profile (―the Agency Identifier‖); (3) a ―Specimen
Identification Number‖ which the FBI states is ―generally a
number assigned sequentially at the time of sample
collection‖ and ―does not correspond to the individual‘s
social security number, criminal history identifier, or
correctional facility identifier;‖ and (4) information
identifying the laboratory personnel associated with creating
the profile. Id. The FBI‘s restrictions on the type of
11

―NDIS‖ refers to the ―National DNA Index System‖ which
―is considered one part of CODIS.‖ Federal Bureau of
Investigation, CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-factsheet (last visited July 8, 2011).
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information stored in CODIS reflect Congress‘s concern
about creating ―strict privacy protections.‖ H.R. Rep. No.
106-900(I), at 27. Therefore, a user conducting a search of
CODIS can access only a limited amount of information,
none of which identifies the person to whom the profile
belongs.
The second relevant Government policy pertains to the
data used to create the profile. Neither the DNA Act nor the
Crime Control Act specifies what portion of the DNA shall be
used in creating the profile included in CODIS. See 42
U.S.C. § 14135a(c)(2) (defining DNA analysis as ―analysis of
the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) identification information
in a bodily sample‖); Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13 n.10.
Nevertheless, in practice, the FBI has developed a consistent
policy of analyzing only what is commonly called ―junk
DNA.‖
CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-factsheet (last visited July 8, 2011); accord Weikert, 504 F.3d at
13 n.10 (―The government has stated repeatedly that it uses
only junk DNA in creating individual DNA profiles. . . . For
purposes of this appeal, we take the government at its word . .
. .‖). ―Junk DNA‖ refers to ―non-genic stretches of DNA not
presently recognized as being responsible for trait coding.‖
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004)
(en banc) (plurality op.). By using only so-called ―junk
DNA‖ to create the profile, the Government ensures that
meaningful personal genetic information about the individual
is not published in CODIS.
Some explanation of the process by which the profile
is created will illuminate this important feature of CODIS.
The DNA profiles in CODIS make ―use of short tandem
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repeat technology (―STR‖)‖ that are ―located at 13 markers
(or loci) on DNA present in the specimen.‖ Kincade, 379
F.3d at 818. STRs have been described as repeated sequences
of the ―base pairs‖ of DNA. Henry T. Greely et al., Family
Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch
Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 248, 249 (2006). They
are found at ―thirteen specific regions, or loci, on an
individual‘s DNA.‖ Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 65-66
(1st Cir. 2010). Again, these loci are ―non-genic stretches of
DNA not presently recognized as being responsible for trait
coding.‖ Kincade, 379 F.3d at 818.
STRs are useful for identification not because of any
genetic information but because they ―result[] in different
numbers of copies of repeated sequences.‖ Greely, supra, at
249. For example, ―[o]ne person might have two copies of
the first marker that are four and eight repeats long, copies of
the second that are eleven and twenty-three copies long,
copies of the third that are three and ten copies long, and so
on through all thirteen markers.‖ Id. at 250. Therefore, it is
―[t]he fact that these stretches of DNA have a different
number of these repeats [that] makes them useful as
‗markers.‘‖ Id. These ―repeats‖ ―have no function.‖ Id.
―They do not code for RNA, and they do not seem to be
responsible for any difference in the structure or functioning
of the people who carry them.‖ Id.
The legislative history of the DNA Act confirms that
these ―genetic markers‖ were ―purposely selected because
they are not associated with any known physical or medical
characteristics, providing further assurance against the use of
convicted offender DNA profiles for purposes other than law
enforcement identification.‖ H.R. Rep. No. 106-900(I), at 27.
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Effectively, the use of ―junk DNA‖ creates a ―DNA
fingerprint‖ that yields precise information about identity but
little or no other personal information.12 As stated in the
House Report:
DNA profiles generated in conformity with the
national standards do not reveal information
relating to any medical condition or other trait.
By design, the effect of the system is to provide
a kind of genetic fingerprint, which uniquely
identifies an individual, but does not provide a
basis for determining or inferring anything else
about the person.
Id. Due to the nature of DNA and the number of loci used to
create the profile, ―the chance that two randomly selected
individuals will share the same profile [is] infinitesimal—as
are the chances that a person randomly selected from the
population at large will present the same DNA profile as that
drawn from crime-scene evidence.‖ Kincade, 379 F.3d at 819
(plurality op.).

12

In practice, ―[b]ecause there are observed group variances
in the representation of various alleles at the STR loci . . . ,
DNA profiles derived by STR may yield probabilistic
evidence of the contributor‘s race or sex.‖ Kincade, 379 F.3d
at 818 (plurality op.). Nevertheless, based on ―the substantial
number of alleles present at each of the 13 STR loci (between
7 and 20) and wide-spread variances in their representation
among human beings,‖ DNA profiles created through STR
are ―highly individuated.‖ Id. at 818–19 (internal citation
omitted).
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In 2005 and 2006, Congress expanded the categories
of individuals subject to DNA collection. In its present form,
the DNA Act allows the Attorney General to ―collect DNA
samples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or
convicted.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A). The latest
expansion went into effect with the promulgation of
regulations by the Attorney General effective January 9,
2009. See 28 C.F.R. § 28.12. In relevant part, the regulations
provide that ―[a]ny agency of the United States that arrests or
detains individuals or supervises individuals facing charges
shall collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested,
facing charges, or convicted.‖
Id. § 28.12(b).
The
regulations also recognize the Attorney General‘s authority to
limit the individuals from whom DNA is collected: ―Unless
otherwise directed by the Attorney General, the collection of
DNA samples under this paragraph may be limited to
individuals from whom the agency collects fingerprints and
may be subject to other limitations or exceptions approved by
the Attorney General.‖ Id. While the DNA Act permits the
collection of DNA samples from individuals who are arrested
or facing charges, the regulation mandates such collection.
The DNA Act and its state-law analogues have been
subject to numerous constitutional challenges, generally on
the ground that DNA collection and analysis is an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Every federal circuit court to have considered these statutes as
applied to an individual who has been convicted and is either
incarcerated or on probation, parole, or supervised release has
upheld the constitutionality of the challenged statute.13 The
13

See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 532 F.3d 32, 36–37 (1st
Cir. 2008); United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 950 (9th
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Ninth Circuit, the only other Court of Appeals to have
considered whether the statute is constitutional as applied to
arrestees or pretrial detainees, initially upheld the expanded
version of the DNA Act. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d
1213, 1219-24 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that under the
totality of the circumstances test, collection of DNA samples
under the DNA Fingerprint Act from a defendant who has
been indicted, arrested, and detained for a federal felony but
not yet convicted complies with the Fourth Amendment),
though it has since withdrawn the panel opinions in
anticipation of en banc review.14
Cir. 2007); Weikert, 504 F.3d at 15; Banks v. United States,
490 F.3d 1178, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v.
Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 679–81 (6th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924–25 (8th Cir. 2006); Johnson v.
Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Nicholas v.
Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 2005); Sczubelek, 402 F.3d
at 177; Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839. Recently, in Boroian,
supra, the First Circuit addressed the issue of whether the
Government‘s retention of a former probationer‘s DNA
profile in CODIS implicated the Fourth Amendment. The
Court of Appeals held that the ―FBI‘s retention and periodic
matching of [the offender‘s DNA profile] against other
profiles in CODIS for the purpose of identification‖ did not
constitute an ―intrusion on the offender‘s legitimate
expectation of privacy and thus [did] not constitute a separate
Fourth Amendment search.‖ 616 F.3d at 68.
14

On June 2, 2011, the Ninth Circuit voted to rehear Pool en
banc. The three-judge opinion may no longer ―be cited as
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B. Analytical Framework
In analyzing Mitchell‘s Fourth Amendment challenge
to the 2006 DNA Act, the District Court performed a ―totality
of the circumstances‖ test, balancing ―‗on the one hand, the
degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual‘s
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which [the search] is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.‘‖ Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (quoting Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). Mitchell argued
before the District Court that the proper approach was the
―special needs‖ exception as set forth in Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). On appeal, Mitchell no longer
challenges the District Court‘s adoption of the totality of the
circumstances test, instead arguing that the search is
unjustifiable under such an approach. Although the District
Court‘s form of analysis is uncontested, because we exercise
plenary review, we determine de novo the appropriate
analytical framework for assessing Mitchell‘s challenge.
Prior to Congress‘s 2005 and 2006 expansions of the
DNA Act, every circuit court to have considered the
constitutionality of a DNA indexing statute upheld the statute
under the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, the circuits have
divided regarding the correct method of Fourth Amendment
analysis. We and the majority of circuits—the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of
Columbia—have endorsed a totality of the circumstances
binding precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.‖
United States v. Pool, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 2151202, at *1
(9th Cir. June 2, 2011).
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approach.15 See Weikert, 504 F.3d at 9–11; Sczubelek, 402
F.3d at 184; Jones, 962 F.2d at 306–08; Groceman, 354 F.3d
at 413; Wilson, 517 F.3d at 427; Kraklio, 451 F.3d at 924;
Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 946; Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273,
1278 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489,
494 n.1, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In Sczubelek, a case
concerning the constitutionality of the DNA Act as applied to
individuals on supervised release, we examined both
approaches and concluded that the proper mode of analysis
was the totality of the circumstances test. 402 F.3d at 184.
We rejected the special needs approach on the grounds that
―the purpose for the collection of DNA goes well beyond the
supervision by the Probation Office of an individual on
supervised release.‖ Id.; accord Weikert, 504 F.3d at 10
(holding that the special needs test is inappropriate as ―law
enforcement objectives predominate‖ in the collection of
DNA).
Sczubelek and the other cases adopting the totality of
the circumstances approach rely on Knights and on Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), which concern, respectively,
searches of a probationer and a parolee. The totality of the
circumstances approach, however, applies to circumstances
beyond the supervised release setting. The Supreme Court
15

Only the Second and Seventh Circuits have consistently
held otherwise, employing the special needs exception in
every case concerning the constitutionality of a DNA
indexing statute. See Amerson, 483 F.3d at 78; Hook, 471
F.3d at 773; Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 677–78 (7th Cir.
2004). The Tenth Circuit has noted that its ―own precedents
are divided,‖ but it applied the totality of the circumstances
test in its most recent case. Banks, 490 F.3d at 1183–84.
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has ―described ‗the balancing of competing interests‘ as ‗the
key principle of the Fourth Amendment.‘‖ Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981)) (further citation omitted); see
also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559–60 (1979) (upholding
the constitutionality of strip searches of pretrial detainees
under a totality of the circumstances balancing approach).
Balancing the totality of the circumstances is the ―general
Fourth Amendment approach‖ used to assess the
reasonableness of a contested search. Knights, 534 U.S. at
118. As such, we follow Sczubelek and apply the totality of
the circumstances test to the present challenge to the latest
iteration of the DNA Act.
1. Case Law Analyzing DNA Collection Following
Conviction
As a starting point, it is useful to examine how the
cases upholding DNA collection following conviction
assessed the totality of the circumstances in concluding that
such searches were reasonable. These cases analyzed
challenges to the DNA Act and its state-law analogues
brought by individuals who were incarcerated following
convictions (―prisoners‖) or by individuals on probation,
parole, or supervised release (collectively, ―probationers‖).16
In our case in this category, Sczubelek, we
―examine[d] . . . the taking of the [DNA] sample under the . .
. Knights totality of the circumstances test‖ and concluded
16

Although the analysis may differ slightly with respect to
individuals on parole, probation, or supervised release, for
present purposes, these differences are immaterial.
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that ―the taking of a DNA sample from an individual on
supervised release is not an unreasonable search.‖ 402 F.3d
at 184. In conducting the Fourth Amendment balancing, we
considered a number of factors. ―First, the intrusion of a
blood test is minimal.‖ Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989)). Second, while
acknowledging that the ―slight intrusion [of a blood test] into
an ordinary citizen‘s privacy [would be] unconstitutional,
individuals on supervised release, like individuals on
probation, ‗do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every
citizen is entitled.‘‖ Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 184 (quoting
Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (internal quotation marks & citations
omitted)). Considering Sczubelek‘s status as an individual
who had been convicted of a felony and who was on
supervised release, we held that he ―ha[d] a reduced right to
privacy—and in particular to privacy of identity. . . .
Individuals on supervised release cannot reasonably expect to
keep information bearing on their physical identity from
government records.‖ Id. at 184–85. Thus, in assessing ―the
degree to which [the DNA collection] intrude[d] on
[Sczubelek‘s] privacy,‖ id. at 182 (internal quotation marks &
citation omitted), we concluded that ―for criminal offenders
the privacy interests implicated by the collection of DNA are
minimal,‖ id. at 185.
On the other side of the scale, ―the degree to which
[DNA collection] is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests,‖ id. at 182 (internal quotation marks
& citation omitted), ―we agree[d] with the government that it
has a compelling interest in the collection of identifying
information of criminal offenders,‖ id. at 185. We reasoned
that ―[a] DNA database promotes increased accuracy in the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases‖ and will ―aid
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in solving crimes when they occur in the future,‖ ―help to
exculpate individuals who are serving sentences of
imprisonment for crimes they did not commit,‖ and ―help to
eliminate individuals from suspect lists when crimes occur.‖
Id. As such, we concluded that ―[t]he interest in accurate
criminal investigations and prosecutions is a compelling
interest that the DNA Act can reasonably be said to advance.‖
Id.
Finally, we considered additional factors that
contributed to the reasonableness of the search. Analyzing
the prior version of the DNA Act, we held that the Act itself
clearly delineates from whom a sample must be taken,
leaving no discretion to probation officers. Id. at 187.
Moreover, we reasoned, the DNA Act specifies permissible
uses for the samples and punishes unauthorized disclosure of
DNA samples. Id. It also provides for expungement of the
DNA profile from CODIS upon reversal or dismissal of a
conviction. Id. Assessing the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the collection and analysis of DNA samples from
probationers, we concluded:
In view of the importance of the public interests
in the collection of DNA samples from criminal
offenders for entry into a national DNA
database and the degree to which the DNA Act
serves to meet those interests, balanced against
the minimal intrusion occasioned by giving a
blood sample and the reduced privacy
expectations of individuals on supervised
release, we conclude that the collection of DNA
samples from individuals on supervised release,
pursuant to the DNA Act, is not an
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unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
Id.
Our sister circuits have engaged in a very similar
analysis, relying in general on the same considerations that
informed our decision in Sczubelek. The other circuits have
identified some factors that we did not explicitly consider,
such as the government‘s compelling interest in
―contribut[ing] to the solution of past crimes.‖ Kriesel, 508
F.3d at 949. Ultimately, those courts likewise concluded that
the collection of DNA samples from prisoners or probationers
is a reasonable search consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
2. Totality of the Circumstances Analysis
The 2006 revision to the DNA Act expanded its scope
to encompass both arrestees and pretrial detainees. Violence
Against Women & Department of Justice Reauthorization Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1004, 119 Stat. 2960, 3085
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A)).
Mitchell was placed in pretrial detention following his arrest
and was detained at the time that the Government sought to
collect a sample of his DNA pursuant to the DNA Act and its
implementing regulation. Thus the challenge currently before
us implicates the collection of DNA from an individual who
is both an arrestee and a pretrial detainee.
As a threshold matter, we must tackle the question of
whether Mitchell‘s attack on 42 U.S.C. § 14135a is in the
form of an as-applied or a facial challenge. Following oral
argument, this Court requested additional briefing to clarify
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this issue, which ultimately affects the burden on Mitchell. A
party asserting a facial challenge ―must establish that no set
of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.‖
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). That is,
Mitchell would have to show that the ―[statute] is
unconstitutional in all of its applications.‖ Wash. State
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449
(2008) (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745). This is the ―most
difficult challenge to mount successfully.‖ Salerno, 481 U.S.
at 745. On the other hand, ―[a]n as-applied attack . . . does
not contend that a law is unconstitutional as written but that
its application to a particular person under particular
circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional right.‖
United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir.
2010).
If the additional briefing makes one thing clear, it is
that the parties dispute whether Mitchell‘s challenge was
facial or as-applied.17 In addition, the District Court did not

17

At oral argument, in response to a question regarding
whether Mitchell raised an as-applied or a facial challenge,
the FPD responded that Mitchell advanced a facial attack on
the statute. Notwithstanding the FPD‘s statement during oral
argument, in the additional briefing submitted to the Court,
the FPD maintained that Mitchell‘s challenge to the statute is,
and had always been, as-applied. The FPD contended that
Mitchell‘s legal arguments focused on the particular
circumstances of his situation, thus narrowing the nature of
his challenge to the statute. The FPD also argued that the
Government‘s position on appeal revealed that the
Government believed that Mitchell had advanced an as-
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specify what type of challenge it was considering, and the
original briefs filed with this court are similarly ambiguous.
Given that there is no consensus among the parties about the
type of legal challenge being asserted, we will address both.
In doing so, we adopt an approach similar to the one we took
recently in Marcavage, 609 F.3d at 273, where after finding
that there was some ambiguity about whether the defendant
advanced an as-applied or a facial challenge, we addressed
both. While we note that facial challenges are disfavored,
Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450, the circumstances
in this situation weigh in favor of addressing both challenges.
We will begin with Mitchell‘s as-applied challenge.
See Connection Distributing Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321,
327-28 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that ―[t]he ‗usual judicial
practice‘ is to address an as-applied challenge before a facial
challenge‖) (citing Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1989)). In order to mount a
successful as-applied challenge, Mitchell must show that
―under [these] particular circumstances [he was] deprived . . .
of a constitutional right.‖ Marcavage, 609 F.3d at 273.
applied challenge. Mitchell‘s appointed counsel, Knorr,
joined the FPD‘s submission.
Not surprisingly, the Government‘s position was that
Mitchell‘s challenge to the statute is, and always has been, a
facial challenge. The Government submitted that Mitchell
presented a facial challenge in the District Court, which the
court treated as such, and that, on appeal, the Government
framed the issues as relating to the facial constitutionality of
the statue.
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a. Expectation of Privacy
When we analyze the reasonableness of a search by
examining the totality of the circumstances, we begin ―‗by
assessing . . . the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon
an individual‘s privacy.‘‖ Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–19
(quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300).
The collection of DNA under § 14135a entails two
separate ―searches.‖ The first is the physical collection of the
DNA sample. Neither party disputes that the collection of a
DNA sample constitutes an invasion of privacy that is subject
to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment, and we have so
held. See Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 182 (concluding that giving
a required blood sample for DNA analysis is a search);
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (holding that ―[w]e have long
recognized that a compelled intrusion into the body for blood
to be analyzed for alcohol content must be deemed a Fourth
Amendment search. . . . This physical intrusion, penetrating
beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.‖ (internal
quotation marks, citations, & some alterations omitted)).
Mitchell contends that the act of collecting a DNA
sample ―constitute[s] [a] significant invasion[] of an
individual‘s bodily integrity and privacy.‖ (Mitchell Br. 41.)
This argument, however, is foreclosed by binding precedent.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the ―intrusion
occasioned by a blood test is not significant, since such ‗tests
are a commonplace in these days of periodic physical
examinations and experience with them teaches that the
quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most
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people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or
pain.‘‖ Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (quoting Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)); accord Sczubelek, 402
F.3d at 184 (―[T]he intrusion of a blood test is minimal.‖).
Moreover, ―Schmerber recognized society‘s judgment that
blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition
on an individual‘s personal privacy and bodily integrity.‖
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985). Thus, Mitchell‘s
characterization to the contrary must fail.
Furthermore, the test sanctioned in Schmerber was
venipuncture, in which blood was drawn from the arm. 384
U.S. at 759-60. ―[C]urrently the FBI provides kits that allow
a blood sample to be collected by means of a finger prick,‖ a
far less invasive procedure. DNA-Sample Collection &
Biological Evidence Preservation in the Federal Jurisdiction
(―DNA-Sample Collection‖), 73 Fed. Reg. 74932, 74935
(Dec. 10, 2008). DNA samples may also be collected by
swabbing the inside of the mouth (a ―buccal swab‖). Id. This
method is likewise less invasive than venipuncture. Nicholas
v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that
cheek swabs, although constituting a search, are less invasive
than blood draws); cf. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (noting that
breath tests are less intrusive than blood tests as they ―do not
require piercing the skin and may be conducted safely outside
a hospital environment‖).
In light of this precedent, the act of collecting a DNA
sample is ―neither a significant nor an unusual intrusion.‖
Weikert, 504 F.3d at 12. Therefore, in balancing the interests
required in our Fourth Amendment analysis, the intrusion
occasioned by the act of collecting the DNA sample is
minimal and does not weigh significantly in Mitchell‘s favor.
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The second ―search‖ at issue is, of course, the
processing of the DNA sample and creation of the DNA
profile for CODIS. This search also has the potential to
infringe upon privacy interests. See Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at
182; Amerson, 483 F.3d at 85. Mitchell argues that this
intrusion is significant and unreasonable given that ―the scope
of information that can be obtained from a DNA sample is
extraordinarily broad.‖ (Mitchell Br. 34.) Furthermore,
Mitchell speculates that the Government might disregard its
policy of using only ―junk DNA‖ and surmises that, with
technological advances, ―junk DNA‖ could reveal far more
extensive information than it presently discloses. These
concerns weighed heavily in the District Court‘s analysis and
caused the District Court to conclude that DNA is ―an
information science,‖ ―not an identification science.‖
Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
We are ―mindful of the vast amount of sensitive
information that can be mined from a person‘s DNA and the
very strong privacy interests that all individuals have in this
information.‖ Amerson, 483 F.3d at 85. Nevertheless, every
one of our sister circuits to have considered the concerns
raised by Mitchell has rejected them given their speculative
nature and the safeguards attendant to DNA collection and
analysis. See, e.g., Boroian, 616 F.3d at 66-69; Kriesel, 508
F.3d at 948 & n.10. As the First Circuit held, the ―DNA Act
offers a substantial deterrent to such hypothetical abuse by
imposing a criminal penalty for misuse of DNA samples. . . .
[O]n the record before us, the possibility that junk DNA may
not be junk DNA some day also does not significantly
augment [the defendant‘s] privacy interest in the present
case.‖ Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13. Mitchell‘s concerns are not
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reflected in the record before us. The mere possibility of such
misuse ―can be accorded only limited weight in a balancing
analysis that focuses on present circumstances.‖ Weikert, 504
F.3d at 13; accord Banks, 490 F.3d at 1191.
Mitchell also highlights the potential misuse of the
information contained in the DNA profile. While Mitchell
has not provided any evidence of misuse of a DNA sample or
profile, we are also reassured by the numerous protections in
place guarding against that possibility. As we explained
earlier, the Act criminalizes the misuse of both the sample
and the analysis generated from the sample. 42 U.S.C. §
14135e(c). These criminal penalties offer a ―substantial
deterrent to such hypothetical abuse‖ of the kind advanced by
Mitchell. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13. Additional protections
exist. The Act provides that failure to comply with ―the
quality control and privacy requirements‖ can result in
cancellation of access to CODIS. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(c).
Access to the ―computer terminals/servers containing the
CODIS software,‖ which are ―located in physically secure
space at a criminal justice agency,‖ is restricted to ―those
individuals authorized to use CODIS and approved by the
FBI.‖
CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-factsheet (last visited July 8, 2011).
Moreover, the DNA profile may only be used for four
limited purposes. 42 § 14132(b)(3).18 Use of the profile for
18

The parameters of the statute are, of course, essential in
limiting the Government‘s ability to use the information it
collects. Though we need not decide the point today, any
attempt by the Government to go beyond these enumerated
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any other reason would violate the statute and be subject to
the aforementioned criminal penalties. Congress‘s limited
purpose in enacting § 14135a is evident in the history of the
Act. See, e.g., DNA-Sample Collection, 73 Fed. Reg. at
74933 (―These DNA profiles, which embody information
concerning 13 ‗core loci,‘ amount to ‗genetic fingerprints‘
that can be used to identify an individual uniquely, but do not
disclose an individual‘s traits, disorders, or dispositions.‖).
These limits on the lawful use of the DNA profile are further
insured by the method for creating a CODIS profile; that is,
the policy of using only ―junk DNA‖ in creating the DNA
profile, which does not contain any individual genetic
information. The Government further protects the identity of
the sample donor by ensuring that no other potentially
identifying information is contained in the CODIS database.
The second scenario—in which scientific advances
make it possible to extract more information from ―junk
DNA‖—is ―not unforeseeable.‖ Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13.
Nevertheless, our sister circuits have declined to factor this
future risk into their assessment of the constitutionality of the
DNA collection program as it exists at present. See Amerson,
483 F.3d at 85 n.13 (―Should the uses to which ‗junk DNA‘
can be put be shown in the future to be significantly greater
than the record before us today suggests, a reconsideration of
the reasonableness balance struck would be necessary.‖);
Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 948 n.10; Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13. The
First Circuit recently rejected this same argument:

purposes would seem likely to first require congressional
action.
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―[S]cientific advances might make it possible to
deduce information beyond identity from the
junk DNA‖ that forms the thirteen-loci profiles
stored in CODIS. Future government uses of
the DNA profiles in CODIS could potentially
reveal more intimate or private information
about the profile‘s owner and depart from the
uses for which the profiles were originally
lawfully created and retained. In this case,
however, these are merely hypothetical
possibilities. . . . As in Weikert, ―the possibility
that junk DNA may not be junk DNA some day
. . . does not significantly augment [Boroian‘s]
privacy interest in the present case.‖
Boroian, 616 F.3d at 69 (internal citations omitted).
We agree with this analysis. While we acknowledge
the seriousness of Mitchell‘s concerns about the possible
misuse and future use of DNA samples, we conclude that
these hypothetical possibilities are unsupported by the record
before us and thus do not have any substantial weight in our
totality of the circumstances analysis. Should technological
advancements change the value of ―junk DNA,‖
reconsideration of our Fourth Amendment analysis may be
appropriate. Cf. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619,
2629 (2010) (―The judiciary risks error by elaborating too
fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging
technology before its role in society has become clear.‖). At
this juncture, however, we consider the amount and type of
personal information to be contained in the DNA profile to be
nominal. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 838 (―As currently
structured and implemented . . . the DNA Act‘s compulsory
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profiling of qualified federal offenders can only be described
as minimally invasive-both in terms of the bodily intrusion it
occasions, and the information it lawfully produces.‖).
Next, contending that a DNA profile is used for far
more than identity, Mitchell attempts to distinguish a DNA
profile from conventional fingerprints.19 The District Court
19

One way in which Mitchell attempts to distinguish DNA
from fingerprints is to argue that ―[u]nlike fingerprints, DNA
can be used to investigate biological relationships between
individuals.‖ (Mitchell Br. 35) There are two potential uses
of the database that implicate biological relationships. The
first, is an ―ordinary search[] seeking exact matches‖ that
incidentally leads to a partial match, which may or may not
belong to the relative of the person whose profile was run
against the database. DNA-Sample Collection, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 74938. The second is a ―familial search‖ which typically
refers to a purposeful search of the DNA database ―not for
the person who left the crime-scene sample, but rather for a
relative of that individual.‖ Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt:
Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 291,
297, 300 (2010).
The possibility of an unintentional or intentional
CODIS ―hit‖ for Mitchell‘s biological relatives does not
change our analysis. To begin with, Mitchell has not shown
that he has standing to assert the Fourth Amendment rights of
his relatives. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138–40
(1978). Even if he did, the record does not contain any
evidence of a possible search or investigation of Mitchell‘s
relatives, and the claim is entirely speculative. See Boroian,
616 F.3d at 70 (―The record contains no other information
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agreed, holding that ―to compare the fingerprinting process
and the resulting identification information obtained
therefrom with DNA profiling is pure folly.‖ Mitchell, 681 F.
Supp. 2d at 608. Yet many of our sister circuits have
expressly adopted just this analogy:
To be sure, genetic fingerprints differ somewhat
from their metacarpal brethren, and future
technological advances in DNA testing
(coupled with possible expansions of the DNA
Act‘s scope) may empower the government to
conduct wide-ranging ―DNA dragnets‖ that
raise justifiable citations to George Orwell.
Today, however, . . . CODIS operates much like
an old-fashioned fingerprint database (albeit
more efficiently).

shedding light on how frequently partial matches occur in the
national database, exactly what they reveal, or what kind of
follow-up investigation is done when a partial match arises. . .
. [Therefore] . . . that claim is similarly speculative.‖). In this
respect, we also find it significant that CODIS is not designed
for intentional familial searches and experts agree that
searches of that type would not produce any useful
information. DNA-Sample Collection, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74938
(―The current design of the DNA identification system does
not encompass searches of this type against the national DNA
index.‖); see also Murphy, supra at 300 (―[M]ost experts
acknowledge that the current iteration of the CODIS software
does a poor job of identifying true leads in familial
searches.‖).
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Johnson, 440 F.3d at 499 (internal citations omitted);
Boroian, 616 F.3d at 65 (―Under the DNA Act, DNA profiles
currently function as identification records not unlike
fingerprints, photographs, or social security numbers.‖);
accord Banks, 490 F.3d at 1192 (―These restrictions allow the
Government to use an offender‘s DNA profile in substantially
the same way that the Government uses fingerprint and
photographic evidence . . . . Only here, DNA provides a more
advanced and accurate means . . . .‖); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d
1556, 1559 (9th Cir. 1995) (―The information derived from
the blood sample is substantially the same as that derived
from fingerprinting—an identifying marker unique to the
individual from whom the information is derived.‖),
overruled on other grounds, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32 (2000), and Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532
U.S. 67 (2001); Jones, 962 F.2d at 307 (―The governmental
justification for this form of identification . . . relies on no
argument different in kind from that traditionally advanced
for taking fingerprints and photographs, but with additional
force because of the potentially greater precision of DNA
sampling and matching methods.‖).
Like fingerprints, ―at least in the current state of
scientific knowledge, the DNA profile derived from the
[individual‘s] blood sample establishes only a record of the
[individual‘s] identity.‖ Amerson, 483 F.3d at 85; accord
Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 947. Given the protections built into the
DNA Act, the Government‘s stated practice of only analyzing
―junk DNA,‖ and the current limits of technology, the
information stored in CODIS serves only an identification
purpose. Moreover, the regulations of the 2006 amendment
to the DNA Act confirms the intention to use DNA profiles as
―sanitized ‗genetic fingerprints‘ that can be used to identify

48

an individual uniquely, but do not disclose an individual‘s
traits, disorders, or dispositions.‖ DNA-Sample Collection,
73 Fed. Reg. at 74937. Given the record in front of us today,
we conclude that a DNA profile is used solely as an accurate,
unique, identifying marker—in other words, as fingerprints
for the twenty-first century.
Considering a DNA profile as a tool for establishing
identity, the issue becomes the degree to which an individual
has an expectation of privacy in his or her own identity. In
Sczubelek, we considered this issue with respect to
individuals on supervised release and noted that they ―‗do not
enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.‘‖
402 F.3d at 184 (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 119). In light
of this restricted liberty right, we held that ―Sczubelek, as an
individual on supervised release, has a reduced right to
privacy—and in particular to privacy of identity.‖ Id. Our
analysis relied heavily on Sczubelek‘s status as a convicted
felon on supervised release; as such, it cannot be adopted
wholesale in the present case, as Mitchell correctly argues.
Instead, the critical question is whether arrestees and pretrial
detainees who have not been convicted of felonies have a
diminished privacy interest in their identity.
A useful analogue is case law assessing the validity of
fingerprinting arrestees and pretrial detainees as part of a
routine booking process.20 In an early case, the Second
20

Many cases simply assume the propriety of such booking
procedures with little analysis. See, e.g., Napolitano v.
United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1965) (―Taking of
fingerprints [before releasing an arrestee on bail] is
universally standard procedure, and no violation of
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Circuit held that fingerprinting is a ―means for the
identification of prisoners so that they may be apprehended in
the event of escape, so that second offenders may be detected
for purposes of proper sentence where conviction is had, and
so that the government may be able to ascertain . . . whether
the defendant has been previously convicted.‖ United States
v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1932). Acknowledging that
―[a]ny restraint of the person may be burdensome,‖ the court
held that ―[t]he slight interference with the person involved in
finger printing seems to us one which must be borne in the
common interest.‖
Id.
The court emphasized that
fingerprinting arrestees is for the purpose of identification:
Finger printing seems to be no more than an
extension of methods of identification long used
in dealing with persons under arrest for real or
supposed violations of the criminal laws. It is
known to be a very certain means devised by
modern science to reach the desired end, and
has become especially important in a time when
increased population and vast aggregations of
people in urban centers have rendered the
notoriety of the individual in the community no
longer a ready means of identification.

constitutional rights.‖); Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879,
882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (―[I]t is elementary that a person in
lawful custody may be required to submit to photographing
and fingerprinting as part of routine identification
processes.‖); United States v. Iacullo, 226 F.2d 788, 792–93
(7th Cir. 1955).
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Id.; accord United States v. Krapf, 285 F.2d 647, 650–51 (3d
Cir. 1961) (―[Fingerprinting] is a means of identification
which is useful in many circumstances some of which relate
to the enforcement of our laws.‖). The court upheld the
booking procedure based on ―the general right of the
authorities charged with the enforcement of the criminal law
to employ finger printing as an appropriate means to identify
criminals and detect crime.‖21 Kelly, 55 F.2d at 70.
Suspicionless fingerprinting of all citizens would
violate the Fourth Amendment. See Hayes v. Florida, 470
U.S. 811, 813–18 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,
727 (1969). Nevertheless, it is ―elementary‖ that blanket
fingerprinting of individuals who have been lawfully arrested
or charged with a crime does not run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment. Smith, 324 F.2d at 882. The universal
approbation of fingerprinting as a method of identifying
arrestees despite the invasion of privacy ―is not surprising
21

Similar to the maintenance of DNA profiles in CODIS,
fingerprints are stored in a database. When fingerprints are
taken from an arrestee, they are run against a database to
search for matches to other unsolved crimes. This, indeed, is
part of the purpose of fingerprinting an arrestee. See Kelly,
55 F.2d at 68 (noting that fingerprints allow for the detection
of ―second offenders‖). Accessing such fingerprint or DNA
databases does not independently implicate the Fourth
Amendment. Johnson, 440 F.3d at 499 (―We note that the
consequences of the contrary conclusion would be staggering:
Police departments across the country could face an
intolerable burden if every ‗search‘ of an ordinary fingerprint
database were subject to Fourth Amendment challenges. The
same applies to DNA fingerprints.‖).
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when we consider that probable cause had already supplied
the basis for bringing the person within the criminal justice
system. With the person‘s loss of liberty upon arrest comes
the loss of at least some, if not all, rights to personal privacy
otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment.‖ Jones, 962
F.2d at 306; see also Kincade, 379 F.3d at 864 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (―Arrestees‘ privacy interests . . . appear to be
significantly reduced.‖).
This analysis rests on two
foundational principles—the presence of probable cause to
arrest and the use of fingerprints as a method of
identification:
[W]hen a suspect is arrested upon probable
cause, his identification becomes a matter of
legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim
privacy in it. We accept this proposition
because the identification of suspects is relevant
not only to solving the crime for which the
suspect is arrested, but also for maintaining a
permanent record to solve other past and future
crimes.
Jones, 962 F.2d at 306.
Moreover, we permit such
fingerprinting ―whether or not the proof of a particular
suspect‘s crime will involve the use of fingerprint
identification.‖ Id.; accord Rise, 59 F.3d at 1559–60.
This logic extends to the collection and analysis of
DNA samples from arrestees and pretrial detainees. See
Anderson v. Virginia, 650 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Va. 2007) (―A
DNA sample of the accused taken upon arrest, while more
revealing, is no different in character than acquiring
fingerprints upon arrest.‖). DNA collection occurs only after
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it has been determined that there is probable cause to believe
that the arrestee committed a crime. In light of this probable
cause finding, arrestees possess a diminished expectation of
privacy in their own identity, which has traditionally justified
taking their fingerprints and photographs.22
Likewise,
because DNA profiles developed pursuant to the DNA Act
function as ―genetic fingerprints‖ used only for identification
purposes, arrestees and pretrial detainees have reduced
privacy interests in the information derived from a DNA
sample.
Mitchell raises an additional concern with the DNA
Act and its implementing regulations: the potential indefinite
retention of the sample itself. Nothing in the statute instructs
the Government what to do with the DNA sample when an
individual is no longer under correctional supervision.
However, federal law does mandate the expungement of the
DNA profile when the FBI receives a certified copy of a court
order showing that a conviction is overturned or when, if the
sample is taken following an arrest, no charge is filed, the
charge is dismissed, or results in an acquittal. 42 U.S.C. §
14132(d)(1)(A). Ultimately, to the extent that Mitchell
submits that the potential future indefinite retention of his
sample implicates privacy concerns, that issue is not before us
22

In this case, we need not reach the question of whether any
additional probable cause requirement other than the
requirements inherent in the statute—that an individual is
arrested—is necessary. We note, however, that Mitchell was
indicted before his arrest, so that the finding of probable
cause in this case was made by a grand jury and was not left
to the discretion of a policy officer alone.
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now. Mitchell remains arrested, indicted, and detained. His
DNA sample has not yet been collected and he therefore has
not sought expungement. Therefore, he is not in a position to
challenge the retention of his sample. Cf. Weikert, 504 F.3d
at 3 (―Because the appellant is currently on supervised release
and will remain so . . .we do not resolve the question of
whether it is also constitutional to retain the DNA profile in
[CODIS].‖). We leave for another day the question of
whether an individual may challenge the Government‘s
retention of his DNA sample or profile.
In light of the restrictions built into the DNA profiling
process, Mitchell‘s arguments that it constitutes a significant
invasion of privacy are unavailing. Relying on the District
Court‘s opinion, Mitchell argues that collection of DNA from
arrestees and pretrial detainees cannot be justified on the basis
of probable cause as they have not yet been convicted of any
offense and thus have the benefit of the presumption of
innocence. See Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 607. The District
Court properly declined ―to elevate a finding of probable
cause to the level of a proper determination of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.‖ Id. at 606. Nonetheless, it acknowledged
that an arrestee or pretrial detainee, who is brought into the
criminal justice system on the basis of probable cause, ―has a
diminished expectation of privacy in his identity.‖ Id. at 608.
The District Court nevertheless concluded that the
presumption of innocence outweighed this diminished
expectation of privacy because of the ―complex,
comprehensive, inherently private information contained in a
DNA sample.‖ Id. As we discussed above, however, this
conclusion is based on a flawed premise—that because ―DNA
samples may reveal private information regarding familial
lineage and predisposition to over four thousand types of
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genetic conditions and diseases [as well as] genetic markers
for traits,‖ the DNA profiles entered into CODIS also contain
this information. Id. (emphasis added). DNA profiles, as
opposed to DNA samples, reveal only identity, in which
arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy.23
In sum, at present DNA profiling is simply a more
precise method of ascertaining identity and is thus akin to
fingerprinting, which has long been accepted as part of
routine booking procedures. The traditional fingerprinting
cases emphasize that arrestees and pretrial detainees have a
diminished expectation of privacy in their identity. None of
23

Both Mitchell and the District Court rely heavily on
Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 857 (9th Cir. 2009), in
which the Ninth Circuit held that DNA collection from
pretrial detainees was unconstitutional because it was not
related to prison security. The court reasoned that while
penal facilities may conduct administrative searches,
―[n]either the Supreme Court nor our court has permitted
general suspicionless, warrantless searches of pre-trial
detainees for grounds other than institutional security or other
legitimate penological interests.‖ Id. This reasoning does not
undermine the line of case law holding that booking
procedures that confirm an individual‘s identity are both
reasonable and necessary to further legitimate law
enforcement objectives. The Ninth Circuit itself has noted
that ―everyday ‗booking‘ procedures routinely require even
the merely accused to provide fingerprint identification,
regardless of whether investigation of the crime involves
fingerprint evidence.‖ Rise, 59 F.3d at 1560. As Friedman
did not consider the identification purpose of DNA samples,
we are not inclined to follow it.
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Mitchell‘s arguments compels us to conclude that the same
diminished expectation of privacy should not apply to DNA
profiling.
b. Government Interests
The second step in the totality of the circumstances
analysis is to assess ―the degree to which [the search] is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.‖ Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (internal quotation marks
& citation omitted). The Government‘s interests in this case
are not as great as those identified in Sczubelek, as the
interests in supervising convicted individuals on release and
deterring recidivism do not apply to arrestees or pretrial
detainees. 402 F.3d at 186. Nevertheless, the other key
interest recognized in Sczubelek—collecting identifying
information to aid law enforcement—applies with equal force
to arrestees and pretrial detainees. Id. at 185 (―The interest in
accurate criminal investigations and prosecutions is a
compelling interest that the DNA Act can reasonably be said
to advance.‖).
Mitchell acknowledges that DNA profiling serves
important law enforcement interests, but he argues that these
interests can be equally well served by collecting DNA
samples post-conviction. It is true, as Mitchell asserts, that
the information contained in a DNA sample does not change
over time and cannot be concealed; thus, there is no need for
the Government to act quickly to prevent the destruction of
evidence. Nevertheless, the Government argues that there are
other legitimate interests that weigh in favor of pretrial DNA
collection. We agree.
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Most compelling is the Government‘s strong interest in
identifying arrestees. ―[W]hen a suspect is arrested upon
probable cause, his identification becomes a matter of
legitimate state interest.‖ Jones, 962 F.2d at 306. Given ―the
potentially greater precision of DNA sampling and matching
methods,‖ DNA profiling serves this interest better than
fingerprinting. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 186 (quoting Jones,
962 F.2d at 307); accord Banks, 490 F.3d at 1190 (―While
fingerprint evidence might often be sufficient, we have
always recognized the Government‘s compelling need to
accurately identify offenders.‖). Moreover, DNA may permit
identification in cases without fingerprint or eyewitness
evidence. As we explained in Sczubelek:
It is a well recognized aspect of criminal
conduct that the perpetrator will take unusual
steps to conceal not only his conduct, but also
his identity. Disguises used while committing a
crime may be supplemented or replaced by
changed names, and even changed physical
features. Traditional methods of identification
by photographs, historical records, and
fingerprints often prove inadequate. The DNA,
however, is claimed to be unique to each
individual and cannot, within current scientific
knowledge, be altered. The individuality of the
DNA provides a dramatic new tool for the law
enforcement effort to match suspects and
criminal conduct. Even a suspect with altered
physical features cannot escape the match that
his DNA might make with a sample contained
in a DNA bank, or left at the scene of a crime
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within samples of blood, skin, semen or hair
follicles.
402 F.3d at 185 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted);
accord Banks, 490 F.3d at 1190. Thus, DNA collection
furthers the Government‘s interest in accurately identifying
arrestees and pretrial detainees, an interest that would be lost
if the Government waited until conviction to take a DNA
sample.24
The Government‘s ability to accurately identify a
person through their DNA profile cannot be entirely
substituted by other means of identification, such as
fingerprints or photographs. DNA analysis enables the
Government to identify a person who has changed their
appearance, either permanently or temporarily. Weikert, 504
F.3d at 14 (―Even a suspect with altered physical features
cannot escape the match that his DNA might make with a
sample contained in a DNA bank, or left at the scene of a
crime.‖) (citing Amerson, 483 F.3d at 87); accord Sczubelek,
402 F.3d at 185. Similarly, an arrestee who has altered his or
her fingerprints in order to avoid detection could also be
identified with certainty through their DNA. Therefore, the
24

The federal government is not alone in concluding that the
interests served by pretrial DNA collection and testing would
not be adequately served by post-conviction collection. As of
August 10, 2010, twenty-four states have enacted statutes
permitting the collection of a DNA sample from some or all
arrestees.
State Laws for Arrestee DNA Databases,
DNAResource.com
(Aug.
10,
2010),
http://www.dnaresource.com/
documents/ArresteeDNALaws-2010.pdf.
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use of CODIS in the law enforcement process assures greater
precision in the identification of arrestees.
Moreover, there are two components to a person‘s
identity: ―who that person is (the person‘s name, date of
birth, etc.) and what that person has done (whether the
individual has a criminal record, whether he is the same
person who committed an as-yet unsolved crime across town,
etc.).‖ Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1199 (N.D.
Cal. 2009). The second component—what a person has
done—has important pretrial ramifications. Running an
arrestee‘s DNA profile through CODIS could reveal matches
to crime-scene DNA samples from unsolved cases. Whether
an arrestee is possibly implicated in other crimes is critical to
the determination of whether or not to order detention
pending trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) (stating that
factors to be considered in the bail determination include a
person‘s ―past conduct‖ and ―criminal history‖).
To the extent that DNA profiling assists the
Government in accurate criminal investigations and
prosecutions (both of which are dependent on accurately
identifying the suspect), it is in the Government‘s interest to
have this information as soon as possible. Collecting DNA
samples from arrestees can speed both the investigation of the
crime of arrest and the solution of any past crime for which
there is a match in CODIS. Moreover, ―use of CODIS
promptly clears thousands of potential suspects—thereby
preventing them from ever being put in that position, and
advancing the overwhelming public interest in prosecuting
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crimes accurately.‖25 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839 n.38
(plurality op.) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted).
The assistance provided by CODIS is not hypothetical: as of
May 2011, CODIS ―ha[d] produced over 144,400 hits
assisting in more than 138,100 investigations.‖ FBI, CODISNDIS Statistics, available at http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited July 8, 2011). While
25

The Government also argues that the collection of DNA
samples from arrestees helps to detect and deter any
violations of pretrial release. Any such interest is outweighed
by the presumption of innocence, relied on so heavily by
Mitchell. ―The government‘s interest in preventing crime by
arrestees is both legitimate and compelling.‖ United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987). Nevertheless, any
assumption that an arrestee is ―more likely to commit crimes
than other members of the public, without an individualized
determination to that effect, is contradicted by the
presumption of innocence. . . . Defendant is, after all,
constitutionally presumed to be innocent pending trial . . . .‖
United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2006).
That presumption instructs that the fact ―[t]hat an individual
is charged with a crime cannot, as a constitutional matter,
give rise to any inference that he is more likely than any other
citizen to commit a crime if he is released from custody.
Defendant is, after all, constitutionally presumed to be
innocent pending trial, and innocence can only raise an
inference of innocence, not of guilt.‖ Id. Thus, in
comparison to the probationer cases, the interests in
supervision and prevention of recidivism are much
diminished, if not absent, in the context of arrestees and
pretrial detainees.
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Mitchell draws our attention to a backlog in the analysis of
DNA samples, the evidence he cites in support does not point
to any backlog in the federal system.
Finally, we note that the other factors we identified in
Sczubelek as weighing in favor of the reasonableness of the
search apply with equal force in the present case. While the
DNA Act permits the Attorney General to collect DNA
samples from arrestees and pretrial detainees, 42 U.S.C. §
14135a(a)(1)(A), the implementing regulation mandates such
collection, 28 C.F.R. § 28.12. Thus, once the Attorney
General has determined that DNA must be collected, there is
no room for law enforcement officials to exercise (or abuse)
discretion by deciding whether or not to collect a DNA
sample. Moreover, as we discussed more thoroughly above,
the statutory structure contains safeguards to prevent the
improper use of DNA profiles and to ensure the removal of
DNA records from CODIS following a dismissal or an
acquittal.
We therefore hold that 42 U.S.C. § 14315a is
constitutional as applied to Mitchell. For that reason, we also
find that Mitchell‘s facial challenge to the statute fails.
Because the statute is constitutional as applied to Mitchell, he
has not shown that ―there is no set of circumstances‖ under
which the statute may be applied constitutionally. 26 In sum,
26

There is a potential cause for concern with regard to the
scope and breadth of 42 U.S.C. § 14315a. As it is written, the
statute applies, for example, to individuals arrested for federal
misdemeanors. However, Mitchell cannot raise a successful
facial challenge to 42 U.S.C. § 14315a merely by arguing that
it is overbroad. See United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168,
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under the totality of the circumstances, given arrestees‘ and
pretrial detainees‘ diminished expectations of privacy in their
identities and the Government‘s legitimate interests in the
collection of DNA from these individuals, we conclude that
such collection is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Accordingly, the District Court incorrectly
prohibited the Government from collecting a sample of
Mitchell‘s DNA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14315a and 28
C.F.R. § 28.12.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the
Court‘s grant of Mitchell‘s motion in opposition to
DNA collection and the District Court‘s denial
Government‘s motion for reconsideration. We will
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

District
pretrial
of the
remand

172 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011). Outside of the First Amendment,
potential overbreadth does not provide a means for striking
down a statute. See Artway v. Att’y Gen. of State of N.J., 81
F.3d 1235, 1253 n.13 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Salerno, 481
U.S. at 745 (―The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of
circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since
we have not recognized an ‗overbreadth‘ doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment.‖) (citing Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 n.18 (1984)). In Mitchell‘s case,
any concerns about the scope of the statute dissipate in light
of the fact that he was arrested and indicted for a serious drug
offense.
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judges
McKEE, Chief Judge, BARRY, GREENAWAY, JR., and
VANASKIE join, and AMBRO joins as to Part II only,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I find both of the
majority‟s conclusions here – that we have jurisdiction over
this appeal and that the Government‟s program of collecting,
analyzing, and maintaining the DNA of arrestees and pretrial
detainees comports with the Fourth Amendment – to be
seriously flawed. As to jurisdiction, the pretrial order from
which the Government appeals falls squarely outside the
narrow class of orders that warrant interlocutory appeal by the
Government in criminal cases. The Government‟s statutory
interest in collecting and analyzing Mitchell‟s DNA
implicated by the order is neither “important” in the
jurisprudential sense required to justify such appeals, nor
completely separate from the merits of Mitchell‟s case.
With respect to the Fourth Amendment question, the
majority gives short shrift to an arrestee‟s and pretrial
detainee‟s expectation of privacy in his DNA, reducing it to
an interest in identity only, and overstates the significance of
the Government‟s interest in collecting evidence to solve
crimes. It reasons that limitations on the use of an arrestee‟s
most personal information immunizes the Government from
the Fourth Amendment‟s warrant requirement. But this
ignores the fact that the searches and seizure of one‟s DNA
permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a)(1)(A) implicate privacy
interests far more expansive than mere identity. In the face of
such heightened privacy interests, statutory restrictions on the
use of the DNA collected from suspects who have not been
convicted of a crime, though not wholly irrelevant, are not
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panaceas. They cannot offset the severe invasion of privacy
that takes place when an arrestee‟s DNA is seized and
searched. And the intent of the Government in using
arrestees‟ DNA to solve other crimes, while it may be
salutary and helpful in that regard, is not compelling. When
the privacy and Government interests are weighted
appropriately, one can only conclude that the Government‟s
program of warrantless, suspicionless DNA collection from
arrestees and pretrial detainees is fundamentally incompatible
with the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, I respectfully
dissent.
I.
A.
Our ability to review interlocutory appeals by the
Government in criminal cases is extraordinarily restricted.
The traditional limit on interlocutory appeals – the finaljudgment rule – is “„at its strongest in the field of criminal
law,‟” where the accused (and society as a whole) have a
strong interest in resolving criminal charges quickly.
Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264 (1984) (quoting
United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263,
265 (1982)). Although the collateral-order doctrine provides
an exception to the final-judgment rule that may be applied in
criminal cases, Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 403
(1957), the Supreme Court requires that we “interpret[] the
requirements of the collateral-order exception to the final
judgment rule with the utmost strictness in criminal cases,”
Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 265-66. Heeding the Supreme Court‟s
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mandate, the Courts of Appeals have only sparingly exercised
jurisdiction over prejudgment appeals in criminal cases.1
Our jurisdiction is further limited in this case because
the Government, not the defendant, seeks review of the
District Court‟s order. As the majority itself recognizes,
many criminal cases holding that interlocutory review is
warranted implicate the rights of the defendant. Maj. Op. 15.
The exceptional instances where courts have exercised
collateral-order jurisdiction over Government appeals in
criminal cases involved substantial interests that would be
lost without interlocutory review. For instance, in United
States v. Whittaker, 268 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2001), we
exercised interlocutory jurisdiction over a district-court order
that leveled a wholesale challenge at the Government‟s right
to be represented by the United States Attorney in the district
of the prosecution. In a similar case, United States v. Bolden,
353 F.3d 870, 875-76 (10th Cir. 2003), the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals explained that an order disqualifying the
United States Attorney‟s office “raises important separation
1

Although the majority relies heavily on cases
involving post-judgment appeals, such as United States v.
Peterson, 394 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2005), these cases are
inapposite, as they present no risk that the Government‟s
appeal will disrupt district court proceedings. Cf. United
States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 231 (4th Cir. 2007)
(“Moussaoui II”) (exercising collateral-order jurisdiction over
an appeal of a post-judgment order because “accepting
jurisdiction over the appeal in no way prolongs the
Government‟s prosecution of Moussaoui, who has already
been sentenced”).
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of powers issues,” which “are undoubtedly jurisprudentially
important,” especially because “disqualifying an entire United
States Attorney‟s office is almost always reversible error.”2
But in other cases, even those implicating “substantial
national security concerns,” courts have declined to exercise
interlocutory review. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui,
333 F.3d 509, 516 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Moussaoui I”) (declining
to exercise interlocutory jurisdiction over Government‟s
appeal from a pretrial order, despite “substantial national
security concerns” implicated by the order).
B.
To exercise jurisdiction under the collateral-order
doctrine, we must find that the District Court‟s order
“conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, resolve[s]
an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action, and [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 473 U.S.
463, 468 (1978). If the order fails to satisfy any of these
requirements, it is not an appealable collateral order. We, Inc.
v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 322, 324 (3d Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted).
2

The majority also cites United States v. Santtini, 963
F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1992), as a case in which we held that
“interests asserted by the Government . . . are sufficiently
important to merit interlocutory review.” Maj. Op. 16. But in
Santtini, we specifically “refrain[ed] from hearing the
government‟s appeal under section 1291” because we found
that the order underlying the Government‟s appeal did not
satisfy all of the collateral-order doctrine‟s requirements. 963
F.2d at 592.
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Construing these requirements strictly, as we must, I
cannot agree with the majority that the order in this case
“resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action.” Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468.
As the majority correctly points out, this requirement contains
“„two sub-requirements: (a) the issue must be important; and
(b) the issue must be completely separate from the merits of
the action.‟” Maj. Op. 15 (quoting United States v. Wecht,
537 F.3d 222, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)). Neither is met in this
case.
First, it is not enough to conclude, in the abstract, that
the Government‟s asserted interest is “important.” To satisfy
the collateral-order rule, we must satisfy ourselves that the
Government‟s asserted right is “„important in a
jurisprudential sense,‟” i.e., important enough to “„overcome
the policies militating against interlocutory appeals.‟” Praxis
Props., Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 947 F.2d 49, 56 (3d Cir.
1991) (citation omitted). Few issues satisfy this stringent test.
Some violations of constitutional rights qualify, see, e.g.,
Wecht, 537 F.3d at 231 (holding order restricting “the
public‟s right of access to judicial proceedings” immediately
appealable because that right “is a constitutional right of
sufficient weight to permit the possibility of departing from
ordinary final judgment principles” and “contemporaneous
disclosure” of information pertaining to the trial would be lost
if appeal were to be postponed); Abney v. United States, 431
U.S. 651, 660 (1977) (orders denying motions to dismiss on
double jeopardy grounds are immediately appealable because
“the rights conferred on a criminal accused by the Double
Jeopardy Clause would be significantly undermined if
appellate review of double jeopardy claims were postponed
until after conviction and sentence”), but others do not. Even
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a defendant‟s right to interlocutory review is not automatic.
For instance, despite the significance of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, an order disqualifying defense counsel “lacks
the critical characteristics” of jurisprudential significance to
merit interlocutory review. Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 266.
Similarly, a defendant cannot obtain interlocutory review by
claiming a violation of the right to a speedy trial, United
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 857 (1978), or a violation
of grand jury secrecy rules, Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United
States, 489 U.S. 794, 800-02 (1989), notwithstanding the
constitutional import of those rules.
In this case, the Government claims an interest that is
of Congress‟s doing, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A), and is not
“of constitutional stature.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super.
Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982). Though the
Government‟s statutory authority to collect DNA samples
from arrestees does, as the majority emphasizes, “„raise[]
questions of clear constitutional importance,‟” Maj. Op. 16
(quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003)),
there is no long-standing recognition of this authority to
collect DNA samples (forcibly, in some cases, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 14135a(a)(4)), analyze them, and retain them indefinitely.
Moreover, the constitutional significance is of importance to
the defendant, not the Government. No constitutional right is
implicated by disallowing the taking of the defendant‟s DNA
as occurred here.
The majority suggests that Sell v. United States, 539
U.S. 166 (2003), supports collateral-order jurisdiction over
this case because of the constitutional importance of “the
Government‟s interest in conducting reasonable searches for
law enforcement purposes and individuals‟ rights to be free
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from unreasonable searches.” Maj. Op. 16. But Sell was not
so broad. There, the Court upheld the exercise of collateralorder jurisdiction over an appeal by the defendant from a
pretrial order permitting the Government to administer
medication to a criminal defendant without his permission.
The dispositive issue was that, by the time a post-judgment
appeal could be filed, “Sell will have undergone forced
medication – the very harm that he seeks to avoid.” 539 U.S.
at 176-77. Since “involuntary medical treatment raises
questions of clear constitutional importance,” interlocutory
jurisdiction was appropriate. Id. at 176.3 In Sell, unlike here,
the defendant‟s rights were clearly at issue, and at risk.
Here, by contrast, even if the District Court‟s order is
wrong on the merits, no constitutional right will be forfeited if
we do not exercise jurisdiction over the appeal. The only
harm will be to the Government‟s ability to take action
prescribed by statute. The majority fails to recognize this in
its cursory appraisal of jurisprudential importance. There is
no “sever[e] . . . intrusion” upon the Government here, see
Sell, 539 U.S. at 177; indeed, there is no intrusion upon the
Government at all. The intrusion upon Mitchell would be of
constitutional import, but the impact on the Government‟s
statutory prerogatives is not. It also is of minimal practical
significance. If Mitchell is convicted, the Government will
have the undisputed right to collect his DNA. See United
States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 187 (3d Cir. 2005). If he is
3

Similarly, an order allowing the Government to
collect a defendant‟s DNA by force under 42 U.S.C.
§ 14135a(a)(4)(A) would raise constitutional concerns that
would warrant interlocutory review of an appeal by the
defendant. But that is not the order before us in this case.
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acquitted, he will be entitled by law to have the Government
expunge his DNA profile from its CODIS database. 42
U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A)(ii).
Second, the issue here is not completely separate from
the merits of the prosecution. The majority dismisses
Mitchell‟s concern in this regard by stating that “[n]othing in
the record demonstrates that Mitchell‟s DNA will be an issue
at trial or that the Government intends to compare Mitchell‟s
DNA sample to DNA evidence collected from a crime scene.
. . .” Maj. Op. 19. While that may be true, it ignores the fact
that nothing prevents the Government from using Mitchell‟s
DNA against him at trial. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(2)(C)
(providing that DNA samples and DNA analyses may be
disclosed “in judicial proceedings”). Indeed, the Government
urges the Court to uphold the Government‟s right to collect a
defendant‟s DNA before trial precisely because such
evidence may prove useful to the prosecution of the crime for
which the subject was arrested: “Collection of a defendant‟s
DNA fingerprints at or near the time of arrest serves
important purposes relating directly to the arrest and ensuing
proceedings.” Gov‟t Br. 40 (emphasis added); see id. at 4041 (arguing that DNA collected before trial under
§ 14135a(a)(1)(A) “functions to aid the Government in”
carrying its burden of proof by “identifying the defendant”
and providing additional information about “what that person
has done”). And the majority accepts the Government‟s
argument in this regard, noting that the information coded in
Mitchell‟s DNA has “important pretrial ramifications” and
that the Government needs that information “as soon as
possible” because “DNA profiling assists the Government in
accurate criminal investigations and prosecutions,” including
in the “investigation of the crime of arrest.” Maj. Op. 59
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(emphasis added).4 The Government‟s heightened interest in
obtaining a defendant‟s DNA during the window of time
between his arrest and his acquittal or conviction is based, at
least in part, on its desire to use that DNA to help ascertain
the defendant‟s identity as it relates to his guilt or innocence
of the crime he is currently being charged with. Thus, I
cannot agree with the majority that the question of the
Government‟s right to collect Mitchell‟s DNA is “completely
separate from the merits of the action” when a key reason for
allowing the Government to collect Mitchell‟s DNA is the
potential for the Government to uncover information it can
use in investigating and prosecuting the “crime of arrest.”

4

In addition, at oral argument the Government was
asked whether the DNA collected before trial would be used
to aid judges in determining whether to release pre-trial
detainees on bail. The Government replied in the affirmative.
Indeed, one of the compelling interests identified by the
Government is its interest in determining whether a person
accused of a crime may have been involved in past criminal
activity and, thus, may presently pose a danger to the
community. If the arrestee‟s DNA profile were to reveal such
a history, a judge would want to factor this into his bail
decision, creating another link to the merits of a defendant‟s
prosecution. See United States v. Abuhamara, 389 F.3d 309,
323 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Bail hearings fit comfortably within the
sphere of adversarial proceedings closely related to trial . . . .
[B]ail hearings, like probable cause and suppression hearings,
are frequently hotly contested and require a careful
consideration of a host of facts about the defendant and the
crimes charged.”).
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Because this appeal does not “resolve an important
issue” or pertain to an issue that is “completely separate from
the merits of the action,” and because we must interpret the
collateral-order doctrine “with the utmost strictness” in this
case, we lack jurisdiction over the Government‟s appeal.
Coopers & Lybrand, 473 U.S. at 468; Flanagan, 465 U.S. at
266.
II.
In addressing the merits, the majority concludes that
“the latest and most wide-reaching federal DNA collection
act,” a statute that provides for the warrantless, suspicionless
collection, analysis, and indexing of the DNA of federal
arrestees and pretrial detainees – individuals who have not
been convicted of a crime – does not present a Fourth
Amendment problem. Maj Op. 21. I disagree. The
majority‟s holding means that if a person is arrested for a
federal crime in a case of mistaken identity (an all-toocommon occurrence), the Government has the automatic right
to sample the arrestee‟s DNA, to analyze it, and to include a
profile derived from the DNA sample in CODIS. See 42
U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A), (b). Under the majority‟s holding,
the arrestee has no way to protest or to prevent the
Government from taking his DNA; his only recourse is to
wait and later provide the Government with a “certified copy
of a final court order establishing that” the charges against
him have “been dismissed or [have] resulted in an acquittal,”
or that “no charge was filed within the applicable time
period.” Id. § 14132(d)(1)(A)(ii). Even then, although his
DNA profile will be expunged from CODIS, the Government
will retain his DNA sample indefinitely. I simply cannot
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imagine that our Government can so easily override a
person‟s expectation of privacy in his DNA.
The privacy interests of arrestees, while diminished in
certain, very circumscribed situations, are not so weak as to
permit the Government to intrude into their bodies and extract
the highly sensitive information coded in their genes.
Moreover, the Government‟s asserted interest in this case –
the law enforcement objective of obtaining evidence to assist
in the prosecution of past and future crimes – presents
precisely the potential for abuse the Fourth Amendment was
designed to guard against. Thus, arrestees‟ and pretrial
detainees‟ privacy interests in their DNA are stronger, and the
Government‟s interest in evidence collection for crimesolving purposes is less compelling, than the majority
represents. After distinguishing our holding in United States
v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2005), I will address these
interests in turn.
A.
Sczubelek, which might appear to control this case, is
readily distinguishable. There, we held that the collection and
analysis of DNA samples from individuals convicted of
certain qualified federal offenses do not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 187. Thus, the key question in this case is
whether Mitchell‟s status as an arrestee and pretrial detainee,
as opposed to a convict, makes a difference that precludes the
Government from sampling and analyzing his DNA. It does.
The factors on both sides of the totality-of-the-circumstances
equation are different for arrestees and pretrial detainees than
for convicted felons: arrestees‟ and pretrial detainees‟
expectation of privacy in their DNA is greater, and the
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Government‟s interests in accessing and analyzing that DNA
are much less compelling.5
Convicts (whether prisoners or, as in Sczubelek,
probationers) differ from arrestees and pretrial detainees in an
obvious, but nonetheless critical, respect: they have been
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, not just accused, of a
crime. The conviction carries with it a permanent change in
the person‟s status from ordinary citizen to “lawfully
adjudicated criminal[] . . . whose proven conduct substantially
heightens the government‟s interest in monitoring” him and
“quite properly carries lasting consequences.” United States
v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 836 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(plurality op.). Thus, it comes as no surprise that our analysis
in Sczubelek turned on the defendant‟s conviction, not his
mere arrest, on federal felony charges. See 402 F.3d at 18485 (“After his conviction of a felony, [defendant‟s] identity
became a matter of compelling interest to the government . . .
.”) (emphasis added); see also Maj. Op. 49 (noting that our
analysis in Sczubelek “relied heavily on Sczubelek‟s status as
a convicted felon on supervised release”). Because they have
not been adjudged guilty of any crime or suffered any
corresponding permanent change in their status, arrestees and
5

I agree with the majority that, following Sczubelek,
we must apply the “totality of the circumstances” test to
determine the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” of the
contested search at issue in this case. Maj. Op. 32-33. But I
share Judge McKee‟s concern that, when applied in these
circumstances, such an analysis mimics a “special needs”
analysis “while ignoring that the „need‟ relied upon is law
enforcement.” See Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 199-201 (McKee,
J., dissenting).
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pretrial detainees necessarily retain a greater expectation of
privacy than convicts do.
At the same time, and as the majority concedes,
several of the interests that tipped the balance in the
Government‟s favor in Sczubelek do not carry the same force
in this case. For example, “the interests in supervising
convicted individuals on release and deterring recidivism,”
which we considered important in Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 186,
“do not apply to arrestees or pretrial detainees,” Maj. Op. 56.
The Government‟s interests in this case are limited by the fact
that, unlike convicts, arrestees and pretrial detainees are
entitled to a presumption of innocence. Thus, unlike in
Sczubelek, the Government may not assume that the subjects
of the DNA collection are more likely to commit future
crimes to justify the collection and analysis of their DNA.
See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“That an individual is charged with a crime cannot, as a
constitutional matter, give rise to any inference that he is
more likely than any other citizen to commit a crime if he is
released from custody.”), quoted in Maj. Op. 60 n.25.
B.
Accordingly, Sczubelek does not control. Instead, our
analysis must begin at the starting point for all Fourth
Amendment inquiries: an assessment of the privacy interests
at stake. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19
(2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300
(1999)).
Arrestees and pretrial detainees do not forfeit their
Fourth Amendment privacy protections simply by virtue of
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being arrested. Courts have sanctioned government intrusion
into those rights in only a few, narrow circumstances, such as
searches of a suspect‟s person and the area within his
immediate control incident to his arrest, see, e.g., Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), and prison searches for
the purpose of “maintaining institutional security and
preserving internal order and discipline,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979). Neither circumstance exists in this
case, and the majority does not suggest otherwise. Instead,
the majority premises its entire analysis on the theory that
arrestees and pretrial detainees have a purported “diminished
expectation of privacy in their identities.” Maj. Op. 4. But
this minimizes, and misses, the point, in three ways: (1) there
is much more at stake in this case than arrestees‟ and pretrial
detainees‟ expectation of privacy in their “identities”; (2) a
person‟s DNA is not equivalent to his fingerprints; and (3) no
persuasive authority supports the notion that arrestees and
pretrial detainees enjoy less than a full expectation of privacy
in their DNA.
Before assessing the privacy interest at issue here, it is
important to clarify the nature of the intrusion that takes place
when a DNA sample is taken from an arrestee or pretrial
detainee. First, his cheek is swabbed. This is the initial
search. The swab is followed by a taking – a seizure – of a
sample of fluid containing DNA fluid. The seizure is then
followed by another search of the DNA and the creation from
the retrieved sample of a profile. And so, an arrestee or
pretrial detainee undergoes three separate intrusions: the
search of his mouth, followed by a seizure of fluid, which is
then searched in order to extract the desired end product, the
DNA profile.
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1.

This Case Does
Arrestees’
and
“Identities.”

Not Merely Concern
Pretrial
Detainees’

It is inaccurate to say that the only (or, indeed, even
the primary) privacy concern at stake in this case is arrestees‟
and pretrial detainees‟ “identities.” The real purpose of
collecting arrestees‟ and pretrial detainees‟ DNA samples and
including the resulting DNA profiles in the federal CODIS
database is not to “identify” the arrestee in the sense of
allowing law enforcement to confirm that the correct person
has been arrested or keeping records of who has been in
federal custody, but to use those profiles and the information
they provide as evidence in the prosecution and to solve
additional past and future crimes. See Gov‟t Br. 42-43
(“Collection of DNA fingerprints at the time of arrest or at
another early stage in the criminal justice process can solve,
prevent, and deter subsequent criminal conduct . . . .”); see
also Maj. Op. 24 (noting that CODIS “„allows State and local
forensics laboratories to exchange and compare DNA profiles
electronically in an attempt to link evidence from crime
scenes for which there are no suspects to DNA samples . . .
on file in the system‟” (quoting H.R. Rep. 106-900(I), at 8
(2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2324)); Maj.
Op. 59 (“Collecting DNA samples from arrestees can speed
both the investigation of the crime of arrest and the solution
of any past crime for which there is a match in CODIS.”).
Indeed, to my mind,“[t]he collection of a DNA sample . . .
does not „identify‟ an [arrestee or pretrial detainee] any more
than a search of his home does – it merely collects more and
more information about that [arrestee or pretrial detainee] that
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can be used to investigate unsolved past or future crimes.”
Kincade, 379 F.3d at 857 n.16 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).6
The structure of the statute and accompanying
regulatory scheme confirm that the statute‟s animating
purpose is not to identify the defendant. The statute provides
for expungement of an arrestee‟s or pretrial detainee‟s DNA
profile if the charges do not result in a conviction or if the
Government fails to file charges within the applicable period.
42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A)(ii). If the Government‟s real
interest were in maintaining records of arrestees‟ identities,
there would be no need to expunge those records upon an
acquittal or failure to file charges against the arrestee.
Indeed, this statutory provision serves as an admission that
the fact of conviction, not of mere arrest, justifies a finding
that an individual has a diminished expectation of privacy in
his DNA.
Other features of the regulatory scheme further
undermine the majority‟s conclusion that the relevant privacy
concern here is arrestees‟ and pretrial detainees‟ expectation
6

In Sczubelek, we used the concepts of “identity” and
“identifying information” interchangeably. See 402 F.3d at
184-85 (reasoning that, because convicted offenders cannot
assert a privacy interest in photographs and fingerprints as
“means of identification” they also must forfeit their interests
in the “identifying information” provided by their DNA). But
I submit that there is an important distinction between these
two concepts. It is the identifying information about the
defendant, not his identity as such, that interests the
Government in his DNA. Only through the use of that
identifying information will additional crimes be solved.
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of privacy in their “identities.” The statute and regulations
contemplate collection of a DNA sample and analysis of that
sample to create a “DNA profile,” which is then entered into
CODIS.7 The Government retains the full DNA sample
indefinitely.8 The arrestee‟s or pretrial detainee‟s intact,
unanalyzed DNA sample contains a “„vast amount of
sensitive information,‟” Maj. Op. 42 (quoting United States v.
Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 2007)), beyond the
individual‟s identity, including “familial lineage and
predisposition to over four thousand types of genetic
conditions and diseases” and, potentially, “genetic markers
7

Although the majority considers the collection of the
DNA sample and its subsequent analysis to create the DNA
profile together, the majority and the Government
acknowledge that both are constitutionally significant
searches subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Gov‟t Br.
21-22; Maj. Op. 35-36; see also Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 182
(quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S.
602, 616 (1989)). As discussed above, three separate
instances of search or seizure occur throughout the DNA
collection and analysis process authorized by 42 U.S.C. §
14135(a)(1)(A).
8

The statute provides for the expungement of DNA
profiles from CODIS under certain circumstances, see 42
U.S.C § 14132(d)(1), but does not provide any mechanism for
the disposal of the DNA samples. The Government states
that, “if the conditions for expungement of a DNA profile
under § 14132(d)(1) are satisfied, the FBI disposes of the
DNA sample from which it was derived as well,” Gov‟t
Reply Br. 22, but does not cite any authority to support that
assertion.

17

for traits including aggression, sexual orientation, substance
addiction, and criminal tendencies,” United States v. Mitchell,
681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).
The majority suggests that the “possible misuse and future
use of DNA samples” is a matter of conjecture, Maj. Op. 45,
but that seeks to divert from the issue at hand. Misuse and
future use notwithstanding, the Government has taken,
searched, and retained rich, privacy-laden DNA in the
sample. The majority‟s focus on the Government‟s use of
that DNA as the controlling privacy consideration is simply
misguided. It is akin to saying that if the Government seizes
personal medical information about you but can only use the
subset of that information that serves to identify you, your
privacy interest in the information taken is confined to a mere
interest in your identity. Nothing could be further from the
truth, and the majority engages in sleight of hand by
suggesting otherwise.
The majority does not even attempt to support its
thesis that arrestees and pretrial detainees have a diminished
expectation of privacy in this extremely private and sensitive
information. Instead, it avoids this issue by theorizing that
statutory safeguards concerning the post-collection use of the
samples validate, or justify, their earlier warrantless
collection. Maj. Op. 42-44. But where in our jurisprudence
have we held that post-collection safeguards on the use of
seized material can immunize an otherwise impermissible
search? It bears repeating that a seizure and two invasive
searches have already taken place before any question of the
DNA sample‟s use even comes into play. The majority‟s
emphasis on use to define – in fact, to cabin – the nature of
the interest is not supportable in law or logic.
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With these concerns in mind, it is little comfort that
only so-called “junk DNA” is used to compile a suspect‟s
DNA profile. As our colleagues from the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals have pointed out, “with advances in technology,
junk DNA may reveal far more extensive genetic
information.” United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 947
(9th Cir. 2007). Indeed, studies already “have begun to
question the notion that junk DNA does not contain useful
genetic programming material,” Kincade, 379 F.3d at 818 n.6
(plurality op.) (citation omitted); see also id. at 849-50
(Reinhardt., J., dissenting) (citing additional studies).
Contrary to the majority, which dismisses these concerns as
“hypothetical possibilities . . . unsupported by the record
before us,” Maj. Op. 45, we believe we should not be blind to
the potential for abuse when assessing the legitimacy of
government action. These concerns are legitimate and real,
and should be taken into account in considering the totality of
the circumstances in this case.
2.

DNA Is Not the Same as Fingerprints or
Photographs.

Taking an arrestee‟s picture or fingerprints does not
provide a useful analogy for analyzing the question of
whether the Government may collect and analyze his DNA.
See Maj. Op. 46-53. To the contrary, “[t]he seizure and
indefinite storage of the [DNA] sample, which is what . . . the
government must justify under a Fourth Amendment
exception, is very different from fingerprinting and other
traditional booking procedures.” See United States v. Pool,
621 F.3d 1213, 1238 (9th Cir. 2010) (Schroeder, J.,
dissenting).
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For one thing, collecting and analyzing DNA is much
more intrusive than either fingerprinting or photographing.
As noted above, the DNA samples the Government seeks to
extract contain far more than the mere identifying information
that can be gleaned from a suspect‟s fingerprints or mug shot.
And whereas the science surrounding DNA is still evolving
(and may even be said to be in its early stages), we know that
the potential to use fingerprints and mug shots for purposes
other than identification is limited. Moreover, and quite
obviously, the collection of a person‟s DNA “„requires
production of evidence below the body surface which is not
subject to public view,‟” whereas fingerprinting and
photographing do not. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 197-98
(McKee, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Mills, 686 F.2d 135,
139 (3d Cir. 1982) (emphasis added)). While the Supreme
Court, and we, have held in some circumstances that blood
tests or other bodily intrusions constitute a “minimal”
invasion of an individual‟s privacy interests, see Maj. Op. 3435 & cases cited therein, we should not dismiss any such
intrusion lightly, cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
770 (1966) (“The importance of informed, detached and
deliberate determinations of the issue of whether or not to
invade another‟s body in search of evidence of guilt is
indisputable and great.”); Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 184 (noting
that even the “slight intrusion” of a blood test is
“unconstitutional” when required of “an ordinary citizen”).
At the same time, the Government‟s interest in
collecting fingerprints and photographs is stronger than its
interest in collecting and analyzing DNA. In the case of
photographs and fingerprints, the Government‟s primary
interest is to “identify” suspects in the traditional sense, i.e.,
to “ensure[] that the person who has been arrested is in fact
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the person law enforcement agents believe they have in
custody.” United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104,
1113 (10th Cir. 2006). But with respect to DNA, the
Government‟s primary objective is to solve crimes. I agree
with the majority that the Government‟s interest in
identifying individuals who have been arrested can be strong;
where we part company is in the majority‟s conclusion that it
justifies the warrantless collection and analysis of DNA,
which contains much more than just identifying information.
3.

No Persuasive Authority Supports the
Conclusion that Arrestees and Pretrial
Detainees Have a Diminished Expectation of
Privacy in Their DNA.

Even if arrestees‟ and pretrial detainees‟ expectation of
privacy in their identities were the relevant privacy interest in
this case, the caselaw concerning arrestees‟ and pretrial
detainees‟ reduced expectation of privacy in their identities is
not nearly as broad or clear-cut as the majority suggests.
The majority relies heavily on cases that approve the
use of fingerprinting arrestees and pretrial detainees as part of
routine “booking procedures.”
See Maj. Op. 49-52.
Fingerprinting does not provide a useful analogue in this case
for the reasons outlined above. Even leaving that aside,
however, I disagree that the “booking procedures” cases carry
the weight the majority assigns to them. As the majority
concedes, most modern cases on the subject “assume the
propriety of such booking procedures with little analysis.”
Maj. Op. 49 n.20; see, e.g., Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d
879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (“[I]t is elementary that a person in
lawful custody may be required to submit to photographing . .
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. and fingerprinting . . . as part of routine identification
processes.” (citations omitted)). That is particularly true of
cases that proclaim that the Government has an interest in
using those fingerprints for solving past and future crimes
unrelated to the suspect‟s arrest – they tend simply to state
that “we accept” those practices as a truism, without any
further citation or analysis. See, e.g., Jones v. Murray, 962
F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating, without citation to
authority, “[w]e accept” routine fingerprinting “because the
identification of suspects is relevant not only to solving the
crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also for
maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future
crimes”).
Where courts analyze the reasons we allow routine
fingerprinting in any detail, they typically rely on one of two
justifications: (a) that the evidence may be used to solve the
particular crime for which the government has probable cause
to arrest the suspect or (b) that the Government has a general
interest in what the majority describes as the first
“component” of a person‟s identity – “„who that person
is.‟”9 Maj. Op. 59 (quoting Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp.
9

The Supreme Court employed the former justification
in Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985) (cited in Maj. Op.
51), when it expressed support “for the view that the Fourth
Amendment would permit seizures for the purpose of
fingerprinting, if there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect
has committed a criminal act, if there is a reasonable basis
for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the
suspect’s connection with that crime, and if the procedure is
carried out with dispatch,” id. at 817 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added). United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458
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2d 1187, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 2009)). Both justifications make
sense and may be true in a limited context, but neither one
explains why the Government may collect identifying
information expressly for the purpose of using it against
arrestees in connection with other, unsolved crimes for which
the Government has no basis to suspect the arrestee.
The majority seems to take additional comfort in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals‟ recent holding in United
States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010),10 that a judicial
or grand jury determination of probable cause that an
individual has committed a crime provides a “legitimate
reason” for finding that pretrial releasees have a diminished
expectation of privacy in their DNA. Maj. Op. 30-32; see
also Pool, 621 F.3d at 1220 (“[I]t is doubtful that Pool, or any
other individual having been indicted by a grand jury or
having been subjected to a judicial determination of probable
F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2006), provides a good example of the
latter justification.
In that case, the court explained,
“[f]ingerprinting ensures that the person who has been
arrested is in fact the person law enforcement agents believe
they have in custody,” and “[t]he government always has the
right, and indeed the obligation, to know who it is that they
hold in custody regardless of whether the arrest is later
determined to be illegal,” Id. at 1113 (emphases added).
10

As the majority noted, the Ninth Circuit voted on
June 2, 2011 to rehear Pool en banc. In granting rehearing,
the Ninth Circuit ordered that the three-judge panel opinion
shall not “be cited as binding precedent by or to any court of
the Ninth Circuit.” United States v. Pool, --- F.3d ---, 2011
WL 215102, at *1 (9th Cir. June 2, 2011).

23

cause, has any right to withhold his or her true identification
from the government.”).
I do not find the reasoning of Pool to be applicable
here. As an initial matter, Pool “condones DNA testing for
individuals for whom a judicial or grand jury probable cause
determination has been made; it does not address such
sampling from mere arrestees.” Id. at 1231 (Lucero, J.,
concurring). The majority glosses over that distinction,
announcing the much broader holding that the probable-cause
requirement “inherent in the statute,” which presumably
incorporates an arresting officer‟s finding of probable cause
in addition to findings by a judge or grand jury, is enough to
support a diminution in an arrestee‟s or pretrial detainee‟s
expectation of privacy in his DNA. See Maj. Op. 53 n.22.
The majority never explains why that is the case.
Moreover, Pool, like most fingerprinting cases, never
explains why a finding of probable cause in connection with a
particular crime justifies the collection of DNA profiles for
use in connection with other crimes for which, by definition,
there has been no finding of probable cause or, indeed, any
suspicion at all. I am not persuaded by the concurring
opinion‟s reasoning that a prior “probable cause
determination limits the opportunities for mischief inherent in
a suspicionless search regime.” Pool, 621 F.3d at 1231-32
(Lucero, J., concurring). We do not view a finding of
probable cause for one crime as sufficient justification to
engage in warrantless searches of arrestees‟ or pretrial
detainees‟ homes for evidence of other crimes, see, e.g.,
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (holding that, absent a search
warrant, there is “no . . . justification” for searching an area
not within a suspect‟s immediate control during an arrest), or
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even for purposes of identification, see, e.g., Hayes, 470 U.S.
at 817 (“[N]either reasonable suspicion nor probable cause
would suffice to permit . . . officers to make a warrantless
entry into a person‟s house for the purpose of obtaining
fingerprint identification”). Indeed, even after conviction,
warrantless searches raise serious Fourth Amendment
questions. Where the Supreme Court has upheld such
searches, it has focused on non-law enforcement “special
needs,” as in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74
(1987), or “reasonable suspicion” that the subject of the
search “is engaged in criminal activity,” as in United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001). Neither circumstance
exists in this case.
In light of the foregoing, I do not find any authority to
support a general diminution of arrestees‟ or pretrial
detainees‟ privacy interests by virtue of a finding of probable
cause. Absent such authority, there is no basis for concluding
that arrestees‟ or pretrial detainees‟ expectation of privacy in
their DNA is diminished in any way.
C.
Acknowledging that the Government‟s interests in
“supervising convicted individuals on release and deterring
recidivism do not apply to arrestees or pretrial detainees,” the
majority rests its approval of the DNA collection scheme at
issue here entirely on the Government‟s interest in “collecting
identifying information to aid law enforcement.” Maj. Op.
56. In so doing, the majority seems to have lost sight of the
Fourth Amendment‟s inherent strictures.
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The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by
Oath
or
affirmation,
and
particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Ordinarily, the reasonableness of a
search depends on governmental compliance with the
Warrant Clause, which requires authorities to demonstrate
probable cause to a neutral magistrate and thereby convince
him to provide formal authorization to proceed with a search
by issuance of a particularized warrant.” Kincade, 379 F.3d
at 822 (plurality op.) (citation omitted).
Throughout the years, courts have approved exceptions
to the warrant and probable-cause requirements in certain
carefully defined circumstances, such as searches incident to
arrest, see, e.g., Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, limited, protective
searches based on “reasonable suspicion” of imminent
danger, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), and
generalized prison searches to further legitimate penological
goals, e.g., Florence v. Burlington Cnty., 621 F.3d 296, 307
(3d Cir. 2010) (holding certain jails‟ strip-search procedures
reasonable in light of the jails‟ interests in maintaining
security). See generally Kincade, 379 F.3d at 822-24
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(surveying exceptions to warrant and probable-cause
requirements). But, given the express warrant and probablecause requirements in the Fourth Amendment‟s text, we must
take special care when approving warrantless, suspicionless
searches to ensure that our analysis is well grounded in the
facts and law and that it makes jurisprudential and common
sense.
Our task in Fourth Amendment cases is not to
determine whether some asserted government interest might
theoretically provide a rational basis for the challenged
search. The majority‟s conclusion that the government
interest here is somehow sufficient does just that, and thereby
transforms the analysis into one that is more akin to First
Amendment reasoning.11 But there is no “rational basis”
principle in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court historically has regarded
generalized interests in “law enforcement” as a particularly
suspect type of government interest for Fourth Amendment
purposes, and has specifically held invalid other suspicionless
search programs that are designed to “uncover evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing” by the targets of the search.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000); see
also, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83
(2001) (invalidating hospital program, developed with police
11

In First Amendment cases, our task is first to
determine whether the challenged government action
infringes a fundamental right protected by the Amendment.
If the statute does not do so, the federal or state government
“need only demonstrate a rational basis to justify” it. Ysursa
v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1098, 1098 (2009).
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involvement, of drug testing pregnant women and turning
over evidence of drug use to law enforcement for use in
prosecutions because “the immediate objective of the
searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement
purposes”) (emphasis in original); see generally Sczubelek,
402 F.3d at 190-97 (McKee, J., dissenting) (providing
comprehensive overview of Supreme Court precedent in this
area); Kincade, 379 F.3d at 854 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)
(“Never once in over two hundred years of history has the
Supreme Court approved of a suspicionless search designed
to produce ordinary evidence of criminal wrongdoing by the
police.”); cf. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423-24 (2004)
(holding that searches or seizures designed to elicit
information about a particular crime “in all likelihood
committed by others” are constitutional, unlike those
designed to determine whether the particular individuals
stopped are “committing a crime”).12
This treatment
12

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Lidster supports its determination that a New York DNA
collection statute does not violate the Fourth Amendment,
classifying the DNA collection program as an “informationseeking,” rather than a “crime detection” search. Nicholas v.
Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 668-69 (2d Cir. 2005). Respectfully, I
disagree. Unlike in Lidster, where the Court stressed that the
search sought information from “members of the public for
their help in providing information about a crime in all
likelihood committed by others,” 540 U.S. at 423, the scheme
at issue in this case searches arrestees for the very purpose of
determining whether they – not “others” – are “possibly
implicated in other crimes,” Maj. Op. 59. The vast program
of DNA profiling at issue in this case cannot be characterized
as simply “information-seeking,” and neither the Government
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comports with basic notions of the role the Fourth
Amendment plays in protecting the lives of ordinary citizens.
See, e.g., Kincade, 379 F.3d at 851-52 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (“[The Framers] knew that the use of
suspicionless blanket searches and seizures for investigatory
purposes would „subject unlimited numbers of innocent
persons to the harassment and ignominy incident to
involuntary detention.‟” (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721, 726 (1969)).
The majority ignores all of this context and accepts at
face value the notion that the public interest in prosecuting
crime is a “key interest” that, without more, justifies the
Government‟s collection and analysis of arrestees‟ and
pretrial detainees‟ DNA. See Maj. Op. 56-61. However, in
light of the Fourth Amendment‟s text and the Supreme
Court‟s guidance in interpreting it, the Government‟s interest
in evidence-gathering and crime-solving deserves little or no
weight in our Fourth Amendment review. Even were we to
assume some diminution in arrestees‟ and pretrial detainees‟
expectation of privacy in their DNA, the Government cannot
trump that expectation simply by invoking its interest in
solving crimes.

nor the majority even attempts to justify it on that ground.
Instead, like the program the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional in Edmond, the Government‟s DNA
collection and analysis program here is justified “only by the
generalized and ever-present possibility that” including the
seized DNA in CODIS “may reveal that any given [arrestee
or pretrial detainee] has committed some crime.” 531 U.S. at
44.
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Of course, the Government‟s interest in solving past
and future crimes is a legitimate and serious one. But if that
were our only concern, we would authorize the collection and
inclusion in CODIS of DNA profiles of every citizen – surely,
that would “assist[ ] the Government in accurate criminal
investigations and prosecutions.” Maj. Op. 59. Similarly, if
we hold that this interest prevails over some inchoate
“diminished expectation of privacy,” then we may be opening
the door to the collection and analysis of DNA for crimesolving purposes from the “many other groups of people
who,” under Supreme Court precedent, “have a reduced
expectation of privacy,” including, e.g., “students who attend
public schools and participate in extracurricular activities”
and “drivers and passengers of vehicles.” Sczubelek, 402
F.3d at 198-99 (McKee, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see
also Kincade, 379 F.3d at 844 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)
(“Under the test the plurality employs, any person who
experiences a reduction in his expectation of privacy would
be susceptible to having his blood sample extracted and
included in CODIS – attendees of public high schools or
universities, persons seeking to obtain drivers‟ licenses,
applicants for federal employment, or persons requiring any
form of federal identification, and those who desire to travel
by airplane, just to name a few.”). Routine searches of
arrestees‟ homes would also be permitted as furthering the
Government‟s legitimate crime-solving interests.
The absurdity of these examples underscores that the
Government‟s crime-solving interests, while compelling in
the abstract, cannot carry the day here. Warrantless searches
require so much more. I do not agree with the majority that
arrestees‟ and pretrial detainees‟ expectation of privacy in
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their DNA yields so easily to the Government‟s generalized
evidence-collection and crime-solving concerns.
D.
It should also be noted that the Court has before it a
facial challenge to § 14135(a)(1)(A) and its implementing
regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 28.12, not an as-applied challenge.
The statute and the regulation are unconstitutional on their
face, satisfying even the most stringent standard for a facial
challenge. This standard, announced in United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), requires that the party
asserting the challenge “must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”13
13

In reciting this test for a facial challenge, the majority
fails to mention the uncertainty of its continuing vitality. In
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999), a
plurality of the Court explained that, “[t]o the extent we have
consistently articulated a clear standard for facial challenges,
it is not the Salerno formulation, which has never been the
decisive factor in any decision in this Court, including
Salerno itself.” See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 740 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I do not believe
the Court has ever actually applied such a strict standard [as
no set-of-circumstances], even in Salerno itself, and the Court
does not appear to apply Salerno here.”). Most recently, the
Court has analyzed facial challenges under both the Salerno
standard and the less rigorous rule “that a facial challenge
must fail where the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.”
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552
U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted)
(noting that “some Members of the Court have criticized the
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The test is met here. No set of circumstances exists under
which a statute and regulation mandating DNA collection for
all arrestees and pre-trial detainees can be constitutionally
valid.
The majority approaches the apparent ambiguity in the
nature of Mitchell‟s challenge by, it says, considering both an
as-applied and a facial challenge to the statute. However,
what it refers to as its analysis of Mitchell‟s “as-applied”
challenge is, in fact, an analysis of whether the statute is
constitutional on its face. In balancing Mitchell‟s and the
Government‟s interests, the majority speaks in sweeping and
general terms.14 Aside from a few semantic nods, nothing in
Salerno formulation” and holding that Washington state law
governing primary elections “survives under either
standard.”). Mitchell‟s challenge meets the Court‟s most
exacting standard, but it is unclear whether that is even
required for him to prevail.
14

For example, it describes the intrusions at issue as
“the act of collecting DNA” and “the processing of the DNA
sample and creation of the DNA profile for CODIS,” not as
collecting a particular person‟s DNA under particular
circumstances. Maj. Op. 42. It finds that Mitchell‟s privacy
argument is unavailing “in light of the restrictions built into
the DNA profiling process,” suggesting that the process writ
large – not the particular process that Mitchell underwent – is
constitutionally sound.
Similarly, it explains the
Government‟s interests in general terms. The Government‟s
alleged interest in identifying arrestees, the majority says,
justifies the statute itself, not the statute as it is applied to
Mitchell. Maj. Op. 56-61.
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its “as applied” analysis looks at the DNA Act as applied to
Mitchell in particular. Instead, it evaluates the general
question of whether it is constitutional to collect DNA from
federal arrestees and pretrial detainees. See United States v.
Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) (“An as-applied
attack . . . does not contend that law is unconstitutional as
written but that its application to a particular person under
particular circumstances deprives that person of a
constitutional right.”). The majority concludes from this
analysis that 42 U.S.C. § 14315(a) is constitutional as applied
to Mitchell and, therefore, as this represents a circumstance in
which the statute can be applied constitutionally, that Mitchell
cannot meet the “no set of circumstances” test for a facial
challenge. Maj. Op. 61-62. The majority‟s mislabeling of its
facial analysis as an as-applied analysis is, thus,
inconsequential in the end, but nonetheless perplexing. As an
effort to confine its far-reaching holding, it fails.
Regardless of how Mitchell‟s challenge to 42 U.S.C. §
14315(a) was formulated, the statute and its implementing
regulation are facially unconstitutional.
They require
warrantless, suspicionless collection of DNA from the bodies
of all arrestees and pre-trial detainees. There is no set of
circumstances under which this requirement, i.e., that all
arrestees are to be swabbed, can be said to be constitutional.
Its blanket mandate contradicts basic and essential Fourth
Amendment principles.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent, as I would affirm
the District Court‟s order.

33

